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1. Introduction 
Slavoj Žižek has been referred as the Elvis of cultural theory and is one of the most widely 
known living philosophers today (see for example Taylor 2010, 1–5.). His philosophical 
analysis combines psychoanalysis of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan with the tradi-
tion of German idealism, especially with the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich He-
gel (see for example Sharpe 2004, 1). Žižek comments on a myriad of topics such as 
politics, popular culture, and contemporary philosophical debates. His bibliography con-
tains over 40 books, which range from philosophical analysis of Hegel to psychoanalytic 
interpretations of Alfred Hitchcock’s movies. 
The research question of this thesis is “what is Žižek’s theory of ideology?”. The topic is 
important because Žižek has been one of the main forces in the comeback of ideology 
analysis in social and political theory (see for example Sharpe 2004, 5 & Freeden 2006, 
11). By utilizing the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan, Žižek adds an analysis of 
unconscious desire to the theory of ideology. By analyzing the terrain of unconsciously 
structured desires, Žižek attempts to bring the concept of ideology back into contempo-
rary debates and argue that people in fact more ideological than it seems. This new level 
of unconsciously structured desires, analyzed psychoanalytically, is Žižek’s greatest nov-
elty in discussions on ideology and makes Žižek’s theory thus worth analyzing in detail.  
Besides laying out Žižek’s theory of ideology, this thesis contains an evaluative account 
on his theory as well. The question of ideology critique is at the core of Žižek’s project. 
Žižek analyzes how ideologies have a grip on subjects, and moreover how one can break 
free from the grips of ideology. I will argue that Žižek’s theory of ideology aims to es-
tablish this possibility of critique and emancipation by conducting immanent critique of 
ideology. According to the philosopher Titus Stahl (2013, 2), immanent critique means 
that standards for the critique are derived from the object criticized and not from any 
independent standards outside the object of critique. In other words, in the case of Žižek’s 
theory of ideology, the critique of ideology is conducted from within the same structure 
that makes subjects ideological. I will expound upon Žižek’s immanent critique and eval-
uate if his theory constitutes a credible account of immanent critique in the critical chapter 
of this thesis. 
The method of this thesis is philosophical analysis. By utilizing the method of philosoph-
ical analysis, I can analyze how Žižek thinks, that is how he dissects concepts and their 
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interrelations in his theory of ideology (on philosophical analysis see Rosenberg 1996, 
111). Furthermore, philosophical analysis contains evaluating of the argumentation and 
truth value of theory (Rosenberg 1996, 111–112). In this case, the question is if Žižek’s 
theory of ideology is well argued for and strikes as true or not. Most of Žižek’s arguments 
are not strictly empirical arguments, but rather philosophical, and can thus be evaluated 
philosophically.  
Even though there exists a vast commentary corpus on Žižek, this thesis contains three 
contributions compared to the literature already published. Firstly, in the commentaries 
the concept of ideology is usually employed in a similar manner to Žižek and no precise 
framework has been provided for analyzing his account of ideology in more detail. In the 
first main chapter, I have constructed a framework to analyze Žižek’s theory of ideology 
in a more lucid manner than usually elaborated in the commentaries. This framework is 
combined from various introductory works on ideology and provides a roadmap where 
different theories of ideology can be placed on, Žižek’s theory included. 
Secondly, commentaries on Žižek are usually written in a rather concept-heavy style of 
philosophy. This style of writing has its audience but might need some habituation for the 
non-acquainted reader. The second novelty of my thesis is an introduction to Žižek’s the-
ory of ideology written in a more clear-cut manner that emphasizes clarity by employing 
multiple everyday examples and by minimizing the number of technical concepts re-
quired when introducing Žižek’s multifaceted theory. In the second main chapter, I will 
carry out this introduction to Žižek’s theory of ideology. According to Žižek, ideology is 
an illusion of the completeness of the big Other that takes place in subject’s unconsciously 
structured fantasies. The main bulk of the chapter unpacks this technical-sounding claim 
by introducing Žižek’s Lacanian theory. Unpacking begins by laying out Žižek’s La-
canian theory of language, a theory that I consider to be the backbone of his theory of 
ideology. Secondly, I will introduce the concept of unconscious. Thirdly, I will expound 
upon Žižek’s theory of subjectivity, desire, and fantasy. Only after unpacking these con-
cepts I can finally properly explain Žižek’s theory of ideology. Furthermore, I will map 
out some causes and functions of ideology in Žižek’s theory and place his analysis of 
ideology in the contemporary neoliberal capitalist society. After this introduction to Žižek 
s theory of ideology, at the end of the second main chapter I will return to the framework 
of ideology analysis laid down in the first chapter. I will place Žižek’s theory of ideology 
within this framework in order to summarize his theory of ideology in a condensed, clear, 
and analytical fashion. 
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In the third main chapter, I will evaluate the critical aspects of Žižek’s theory. My third 
novelty of this thesis is that I will provide three criticisms against his account of ideology 
criticism in his theory of ideology. There are similar lines of argumentation in the com-
mentary literature as well, but my contribution is that I will systematize these criticisms 
against his theory in a following fashion: I will argue that his theory of ideology strives 
to set up a possibility of immanent critique on the one hand but does not fulfill the criteria 
required for it on the other. Criteria of immanent critique, outlined by Titus Stahl, are 
what I will label 1. ontological criterion (what there is), 2. epistemological criterion (how 
does one know there is) and a 3. normative criterion (why should we care). In the critical 
chapter, I will elaborate on Stahl’s criteria and argue that Žižek fails all three criteria 
because of three reasons. Firstly, his theory lacks a robust epistemological justification. 
Secondly, his theory of language strikes to me as a self-undermining theory. Thirdly, he 
does not provide any normative criterion on why some ideologies would be better than 
others. Lastly, I will provide a few possible Žižekian answers to the criticisms and thus 
point out a direction for future research. 
A few preliminary remarks regarding this thesis are in order. Firstly, because of Žižek’s 
multifold analysis and complexity of his thought, one can approach Žižek’s theory from 
a variety of different perspectives. In this thesis, I have decided to introduce Žižek’s anal-
ysis by utilizing his Lacanian frame of thought. There might be other possibilities to an-
alyze his body of thought, for example by utilizing Hegelian vocabulary, which is an 
approach he has himself employed considerably alongside his Lacanian analysis (see for 
example Žižek 2013). In my opinion, Žižek’s Lacanian frame of thought suits better the 
analysis of unconsciously structured desires in his theory of ideology because Žižek’s 
theory of desire is based on his reading of Lacan. Therefore, I will make Žižek’s Lacanian 
analysis the starting point of my overview on his theory of ideology. 
Secondly, Žižek utilizes quite a lot of concepts, jargon if you wish, in his analysis. For 
clarity’s sake, I have minimized the number of technical concepts required for this thesis 
and attempted to avoid jargon as far as possible. I have added some more technical con-
cepts in the footnotes if the reader wishes to search for more thorough elaborations on 
some concepts of Žižek’s theory that have been left out of this thesis. Moreover, I have 
provided multiple examples in this thesis in order to clarify Žižek’s otherwise complex 
theory. Because Žižek is often rather difficult to understand, I had to simplify my inter-
pretations of Žižek in this thesis and leave the subtleties of his theory aside. One risks 
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even oversimplification when trying to condense and rephrase his theory in more plain 
language, but I consider this a worthwhile prize to pay in order to achieve clarity.  
Thirdly, I believe that Žižek’s analysis of ideology provides quite a systematic frame-
work. Naturally, there will be other types of interpretations of Žižek as well. It is im-
portant to notice that not all commentaries agree with this kind of systematic reading of 
Žižek (see for example Parker 2004, 116). 
Fourthly and lastly, there is a gap in my reading of Žižek. In the last chapter of the thesis, 
when considering if Žižek’s account can be defended against criticisms, I will arrive to 
the question if Žižek has an ontological theory or not. Here my analysis on Žižek is in-
complete because of two reasons. Firstly, Žižek’s ontological notes are scattered through-
out his massive bibliographical corpus and it would take an immense amount of time and 
effort to collect and analyze them. Secondly, my readings have focused on the earlier 
works of Žižek, mainly before the 2000’s. I have strived to complete the theoretical pic-
ture with more recent commentaries on Žižek, but due to the time limitations of my pro 
gradu thesis, my theoretical work on Žižek’s possible ontology is not conclusive. There-
fore, the question remains if his newer works contain an ontological analysis or not. This 
will be a question for further research. 
The main bibliographical sources of this thesis are Žižek’s first English book The Sublime 
Object of Ideology, which lays down the groundwork of his theory. The Sublime Object 
of Ideology is the most prevalent source in this thesis because of its more systematic, 
introductory nature. There are many other pieces of his theory excerpted from his other 
books as well. As for building the framework of ideology analysis, Raymond Geuss’ The 
Idea of Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (1981) has proven to be 
invaluable in its analytic insights. The most utilized commentary on Žižek in this work is 
philosopher Matthew Sharpe’s book Slavoj Žižek – A Little Piece of the Real (2004), 
which condenses Žižek’s rather difficult language well. Lastly, the criteria of immanent 
critique are outlined by Titus Stahl in his unpublished working paper What is Immanent 
Critique? (2013). These criteria are utilized in the critical chapter on Žižek’s theory of 
ideology. 
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2. Framework of ideology analysis 
Political theorist Michael Freeden argues in his article Ideology and political theory 
(2006, 3) that the concept of ideology is “the problem child” of political analysis. This is 
because there is a myriad of different definitions of the concept. In his article, Freeden 
(2006) goes on to give examples of multiple different uses of ideology. Moreover, in his 
book Ideology – An Introduction, British literary and cultural theorist Terry Eagleton 
states that (1991, 1–2) he has discovered at least 16 different meanings of the concept in 
use. The upshot is that the field of ideology analysis is vast and complex because the 
definition of the concept varies as well.   
Because of the complexity of the concept of ideology, in order to analyze Žižek’s account 
of ideology, I will first construct a framework to distinguish between different theories of 
ideology. After constructing the framework of ideology analysis, I will place Žižek’s the-
ory of ideology within it in order to clarify his account. I will limit the framework of 
ideology analysis in this thesis to a few preliminary definitions or aspects of ideology. I 
will build the framework by utilizing the following questions:  
• What is ideology?  
• Is ideology good or bad? 
• Who is ideological? 
• How and why does ideology cause things?  
• What is ideology’s context? 
 
2.1 What is ideology? 
To begin the mapping, one can firstly ask the “what” question: what is ideology? What 
kind of things, objects, or entities does the concept of ideology refer to? According to 
political philosopher Raymond Geuss in The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and 
the Frankfurt School (1981), there are a few main ways to categorize ideologies. Ideolo-
gies can be considered as referring to or containing discursive (propositional, conceptual) 
things, such as beliefs, ideas, and concepts. Moreover, some definitions of ideology in-
clude non-discursive things, such as habits, rituals, attitudes, forms of artistic activity, and 
traits of persons or groups. Geuss marks with the symbol “etc.” that the non-discursive 
list is not exhaustive (Geuss 1981, 5–6). “Non-discursive” here refers not to concepts and 
propositions, but rather to many kinds of non-lingual action, psychological traits, and 
behavior. 
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From this definition alone one can discern that there are many discursive and non-discur-
sive things that the concept ideology can refer to. I would argue, inspired by Geuss (see 
1981, 5)1, that one can define the concept of ideology in a broad sense or in a narrow 
sense. For example, one can narrow down the scope of ideology analysis to ideology 
defined as discursive beliefs alone and thus leave the non-discursive things, such as psy-
chological traits and behavior, out of the definition. If one does this, one employs the 
concept of ideology in a narrow sense.  
Ideological beliefs can furthermore be defined in a several different ways. For example, 
political scientists Terence Ball and Richard Dagger in their book Ideals and Ideologies 
purport that (2016, part 1) ideological beliefs have four different “perhaps indispensable 
functions for those who subscribe to it”. This list of Ball and Dagger is summarized by 
Warren Morris (2010, x): 
a) “They [ideologies] offer an explanation of something socially important 
b) Provide some criterion for making evaluative judgments about it 
c) Offer social ideals deemed worthy of self[-]identification and 
d) Provide a program of social activism to achieve a cultural idea or so-
cially worthy goal.” (Morris 2010, x) 
Other kinds of lists can be produced to define ideological beliefs and distinguish ideolog-
ical beliefs from any other kinds of beliefs. Therefore, this list is by no means exhaustive 
(see for example Geuss 1981, 10 & Morris 2010, “Introduction” for another kinds of 
lists).  
The upshot of these kinds of lists is to delineate the scope of ideology when defining the 
things ideologies are about. For example, in Ball and Dagger’s view my belief “a cat is 
on a mat” is not an ideological belief per se, whereas my belief that “working life makes 
people miserable, people should oppose working life and work less so they would be 
happier” is an ideological (set of) belief(s) because it satisfies the conditions listed above. 
Ball and Dagger’s suggestion is of course merely one example to define the concept of 
ideology. Defining ideology in this manner only as ideological beliefs is an example of a 
narrow definition of the concept of ideology. 
Moreover, one can have broad definitions of ideology. For example, Terry Eagleton 
(1991, 28) points out that sometimes the concept ideology is used similarly as the term 
 
1 Geuss purports (1981, 5) that when ideology includes not only beliefs and concepts but also psychologi-
cal dispositions and actions as well, one can call it ideology “in the broad sense”. 
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“culture” when it refers to all “signifying practices and symbolic processes in a particular 
society”. The referents of the concept of ideology are wider in these kinds of definitions 
than in the narrow definitions. One can include both discursive and non-discursive ele-
ments in these kinds of broad definitions of ideology. Here ideology refers not only to 
beliefs and concepts but to traits, actions, habits, etc. as well. When analyzing ideologies, 
it is important to define if the concept is employed in a broad or in a narrow sense and 
what kinds of objects, entities, and things does the concept refer to. 
Besides the discursive and non-discursive, broad and narrow definitions, one can answer 
the “what is ideology” question by pointing out what the specific contents of ideological 
beliefs are (see Geuss 1981, 8). For example, someone who holds a capitalist ideology 
might think that privately owned market economy is the realm of liberty, whereas some-
one else who holds a communist ideology might consider privately owned market econ-
omy to be a system of domination and coercion. One can distinguish between ideological 
beliefs by analyzing what their contents are about.  
To recap this section, one can answer the question of what ideology is by analyzing the 
concept ideology with three broad main categories: 
1. Does ideology refer to discursive and/or non-discursive elements? 
2. Is the definition of ideology broad or narrow? 
3. What are the contents of ideological beliefs? 
 
2.2 Is ideology good or bad? 
I will proceed to the “good or bad” question: is ideology good or bad? Geuss (1981, 4–
26) maps out three different main ways to define ideology here. The first answer employs 
the concept of ideology in a descriptive sense.  When the concept is used in a descriptive 
sense, one does not make a judgement on it (Geuss 1981, 5). Ideology is thus considered 
a descriptive term.  In descriptive use, when asked if ideology is good or bad, the answer 
is “I do not take a stand on the question”. Eagleton has a similar definition (1991, 28) 
when he argues that when one defines ideology as culture in general, one does not make 
a judgment on goodness or badness and wrongness or rightness of ideology2. Descriptive 
 
2 Eagleton phrases this (1991, 28) that when the concept of ideology is used similarly to the concept of 
culture, the meaning of the concept is “politically and epistemologically neutral”. 
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uses of the concept bracket out the questions of goodness, badness, rightness and wrong-
ness. 
One can define ideology as something bad as well. According to Geuss (1981, 12), the 
second broad manner to categorize ideologies is to define the concept of ideology in a 
pejorative sense. This definition of ideology holds that ideologies are, by definition, a 
negative thing, and agents (i.e. groups or individuals) in the society who hold ideologies 
are somehow deluded. Geuss states (1981, 12) that when the concept of ideology is em-
ployed pejoratively, it is used in a critical sense, for the aim is to demonstrate to the 
deluded agents that they indeed are deluded and furthermore analyze the reasons why 
they are deluded. By doing this analysis, the point is to free them from this delusion. One 
example of a pejorative use, usually attributed to the Marxist analysis of ideology (ac-
cording to philosopher and social theorist Jan Rehmann 2013, 5) is the Marxist claim 
about false consciousness, according to which people wrongly subject to “alienated forms 
of domination [of capitalism]” rather than pursue their real interests. For example, a 
worker may think that the best profit for the company is for the best for her as well even 
though this might not in reality be the case because of the money-grabbing investors. 
Eagleton (1991, 29–30) has again quite similar definitions in pejorative vein when he 
purports that the concept of ideology can mean ideas and beliefs that are legitimized by 
distortion, mystification or dissimulation. Usually when people utter sentences such as: 
“oh, he is so ideological, do not believe him!” these utterances hold the idea that ideology 
gets something wrong; ideology distorts the truth about matters at hand or does not rep-
resent them truthfully. Inspired by Eagleton (compare 1991, 5)3, I argue that there are at 
least three different kinds of deceptions. Firstly, there are illegitimate universalizations 
(i.e. over-generalizing), for example an argument: “I am a human being who loves metal 
music. Therefore, every human being loves metal music!”. Secondly there are untruthful 
naturalizations (i.e. falsely arguing that some X is natural, and usually by extension 
good)4, for example a claim: “it is natural and therefore good for people to love metal 
music!”. Thirdly there are bogus essentializations (i.e. supposing some Y as a necessary 
property of some X even if it is in fact not true), for example in the claim: “it is in the 
 
3 Eagleton maps out different methods by which a dominant power can legitimate itself. Eagleton’s list 
includes naturalization and universalization as well as many other methods of legitimation (Eagleton 
1991, 5). The examples in this thesis are mine. 
4 This example was inspired bv Karl Marx who criticizes false essentializations of man’s nature in his text 
A Critique of The German Ideology (2000). 
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human essence to love metal music!”. This list of ideological deceptions is not exhaustive 
but offers some examples of ideological deceptions. 
As mentioned previously, in the pejorative use there is an element of deception involved, 
and the point of a critical ideology analysis is to uncover this deception. In this view, the 
main reasons to conduct ideology analysis are normative reasons (compare Jaeggi 2009, 
69). As I interpret Geuss (see 1981, 75–76) and social and political philosopher Rahel 
Jaeggi’s article Rethinking ideology (2009, 69), the idea appears to be that a state of de-
ception is considered itself as something bad, or the state of deception creates or stabilizes 
some morally wrong state of affairs. The point of a pejorative and critical ideology anal-
ysis is not only to analyze the situation at hand but moreover provide a route for emanci-
pation from the grip of ideology (see Jaeggi 2009, 69). For example, not recognizing 
one’s true interests can be considered bad in the example of the worker if she is being 
exploited, and the world would be a morally better place if the worker did recognize the 
exploitation and started to advance her true interests. 
If pejorative use of the concept of ideology defines ideology as something bad, what about 
good then? A positive definition of ideology supposes that ideology is something valuable 
and to be strived for (Geuss 1981, 23). For example, according to Geuss (1981, 23), V. I. 
Lenin considered the ideology of the proletariat to be something valuable in his work 
What is to be Done? where he argued that the proletariat ought to have the right ideology 
to promote their important interests and see through the delusions of bourgeoisie ideol-
ogy.  In my opinion, positive definitions of ideology are few and far between in the liter-
ature when compared to descriptive or pejorative accounts of ideology.  
To recap, one can answer the question “is ideology good or bad?” by defining ideology 
1. Descriptively (“I do not take a stance”), or 
2. Pejoratively (“Ideology is bad and/or wrong”), or 
3. Positively (“Ideology is good and/or right”) 
 
2.3 Who is ideological? 
Let us proceed to the third question, the “who” question: who is ideological? Social sci-
entist Jonathan Leader Maynard suggests in his article Ideological analysis (2017, 5–6) 
that one can distinguish ideologies by defining them as group ideologies, that is “systems 
of ideas held in common by groups”, or as personal ideologies of individual people. An 
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example of an ideology held by individual could be a worker who holds a false belief that 
financiers only desire what is the best for the workers where in fact this may not be the 
case. When the scope of ideology analysis zooms in on this one worker, the analysis fo-
cuses mainly on an individual level. Similarly, when the scope is zoomed out to groups, 
the analysis focuses on group level.  
I would argue that two additions can be made to Maynard’s division. Firstly, one can 
unpack the macro-level group analysis into different kinds of components, such as insti-
tutions, organizations, and more informal groups (see for example Goldthorpe 1985, part 
2 for an elaboration on different social institutions).  Secondly, one can criticize the “who 
is ideological?” question in general by shifting the emphasis from the “who” in the ques-
tion to the processes that create and maintain the agents who are ideological. For example, 
according to academic Terry Locke (2004, 1–2), a critical discourse analytic view holds 
that individual subjects are constituted by the social order and social processes, which are 
historically and socially constructed. In this view, individuals’ ways of conceptualizing 
and constructing the world as well as their actions are effects of discourses5, and individ-
uals are not the main force that maintain the social order (Locke 2004, 1–2). From this 
perspective, I would argue that the emphasis in this view is on the discourses that are 
ideological, not on the individuals who are ideological. It can be thus argued that accord-
ing to this view, the basic unit of analysis of “who is ideological” is in fact discourse, and 
not individuals as such even though individuals might have some relevance as well. 
To recap, one can answer the question “who is ideological?” 
1. On the level of individuals, and/or 
2. Groups (understood as informal groups, and/or institutions, and/or organizations), 
and/or 
3. The basic unit that holds ideology is something else than groups or individuals, 
such as discourses 
 
 
 
5 Locke, points out that “discourse” can be variously defined. For example, he takes up Norman Fair-
clough’s Foucauldian definition that defines “discourse as a ’practice not just of representing the world, 
but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning’ ([Fairclough] 1992a: 64)” 
(Locke 2004, 5). 
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2.4 How and why do ideologies cause things? 
Fourthly, I will focus on the “how and why” question. One can formulate the “how and 
why” question in different ways. I will argue that there are at least three relevant ways to 
formulate this question. One can understand the question causally, functionally, or genet-
ically. 
“How and why do ideologies cause things?” is the simplest main way to formulate the 
“how and why” question. This kind of “how and why” question is a question of causal 
explanation6. As Michael Freeden in the book Ideology – A Very Short Introduction 
(2003, 78–82) and social scientist Göran Therborn in his book The Ideology of Power and 
the Power of Ideology (1980, 77–81) among others suggest, one can analyze ideologies 
based on what they cause in the world. Otherwise one would only speak of ideologies 
only as an abstract set of beliefs and thus overlook the real effects that ideologies cause 
in the world (Freeden 2003, 78–82). Looking from a causal perspective, ideologies are 
held by some agents in the world, and the study of ideology ought to analyze what is it 
that ideologies do in particular contexts or circumstances (see Maynard 2017, 8 & 16–
17). The “how and why” question is therefore connected to the question of “what is ide-
ology’s context?” These questions place ideology in the sphere of the social, not only in 
abstracto, but connected to the real-life processes of society. 
One can ask the “how and why” question differently as well. The second way to rephrase 
the question is a causal question as well, but a more specified causal question (see Little 
1991, 90): how and why do the ideologies function? Or as Raymond Geuss (1981, 15) 
puts it, ideological consciousness can be distinguished by its functional properties, that 
is “a form of consciousness is an ideology in virtue of the function or role it plays in 
supporting, stabilizing, or legitimizing certain kinds of social institutions or practices [my 
emphasis]”. Here the scope of analysis is again in the causal effects of ideologies. And as 
one can see when one follows Geuss’ definition7, not just any causes in this case are 
relevant, but only causes that “support, stabilize, or legitimize certain kinds of social in-
stitutions or practices.” 
 
6 See Little (1991, chapter 2) for an elaboration on causal explanations. 
7 Geuss focuses his functional analysis to “forms of consciousness” (Geuss 1981, 15). I am undecided if 
an analysis of ideology must necessarily be connected to forms consciousness. As I will clarify in this 
thesis, in Žižek’s opinion ideology is unconsciously structured but nevertheless causes effects on con-
sciousness as well. 
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Analyzing these functional properties point us to the direction of functional explanation. 
Philosopher Daniel Little in his book Varieties of Social Explanation – An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Social Science (1991, 94–95) argues that a functional explanation 
has the following structure: 
1. “Causal powers P persist in S [for example, the capitalist class in capitalist society 
S has a causal power P to seek for profit] 
2. The causal power P has the disposition to produce R in the circumstances of S 
[for example, the seek for profit P has the disposition to produce rich bourgeoisie 
R in the circumstances S of capitalist society8] 
3. Causal power P persists because it has the disposition to produce M [for example, 
the seek for profit P persists because it has the disposition to produce bourgeoisie 
mass media M, which convinces the working class about the necessity of a capi-
talist system in this society]  
4. Causal power P’s disposition to produce M causes the persistence of P in S. [for 
example, capitalist class’ causal power P to seek for profit produces bourgeoisie 
mass media M, which influences the working people and thus causes the persis-
tence of capitalist class’ causal power P to seek for profit in capitalist society S.]” 
(Little 1991, 94–95) 
Furthermore, when talking about the functional properties of ideologies specifically, it 
seems that ideologies have this tendency of reproducing themselves as well. As cultural 
theorist Stuart Hall points out (1988, 46), there is an aspect in ideology of “what makes 
good sense”. I take this remark to mean that usually we can find ideologies reasonable 
and even persuasive. Ideologies can, for example excite us, provide us with security, and 
give us a sense of fairness (Boltanski & Chiapello 2005, 164). One can come up with 
other persuasive and reason-giving lists too, but the main point is that ideologies have to 
“stick” somehow, whether explicitly justified or reproduced in more implicit manners. 
Because ideologies justify themselves and “make good sense”, they are not always that 
easy to change. 
The idea here is that ideologies can have a stabilizing and self-enhancing dimension; an 
ideology that persists is one that reproduces itself via different practices (see Geuss 1981, 
15–16) and/or justifications (see for example Boltanski & Chiapello 2005). This point of 
view draws attention to the processual nature of ideologies, more specifically to the 
 
8 At first sight, this second premise seems irrelevant for the functional chain. Little nevertheless wants to 
hold onto the second premise because “P has certain causal powers – in particular, the dispositional prop-
erty to produce certain outcomes”. (Little 1991, 95). I take this to mean that premises 1, 3 and 4 form a 
functional chain and the second premise maps out other, non-functional certain outcomes produced by 
this form of explanation. 
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manners in which ideologies are formed and reformed in social processes (see Therborn 
1980, 77–81).  
There are differences on how functional exactly ideologies are considered as being. For 
example, sociologists Nicholas Abercrombie and Bryan Turner in their 1978 article The 
dominant ideology thesis argued that sociology of knowledge focused too heavily on the 
idea that there is a dominant ideology that in capitalism (1) dominates all other ideologies, 
(2) that subordinated classes endorse, and (3) this dominant ideology “inhibits the devel-
opment of radical dissent” because the subordinated classes endorse it (Abercrombie & 
Turner 1978, 149). This so-called dominant ideology thesis strikes as an example of a 
highly functional model of ideology because it supposes that in capitalism there is a dom-
inating ideology that always functionally inhibits the development of alternative political 
views.  
Nowadays, many argue against such highly functionalist analysis of ideologies. For ex-
ample, Abercrombie and Turner themselves contend with sociologist Stephen Hill that 
this account of a dominant ideology overlooks different contents and effects of ideologies 
in different contexts. Abercrombie et. al. purport (2012, 164–165) that there is no func-
tional necessity of domination exercised by any dominant ideology, but effects of ideolo-
gies are more multifold and indeterminate in different contexts. Moreover, for example 
political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe purport (2014, 182) that discourses 
are plural and are not a part of any clear-cut functional ideological system as the highly 
functionalist account might suppose. Thus, dominant ideologies are not determined, self-
reproducing systems and to conceive them as such would miss the complexity of the 
world ideologies cause things in. 
I will not endorse dominant ideology thesis either. I hold only that widely held ideologies 
have at least some elements, whether explicit or implicit, propositional or non-proposi-
tional that make individuals or groups “stick” to them. I argue that a robust functional 
analysis of ideology explains how the “sticking” ideologies are produced and reproduced. 
Furthermore, a robust analysis maps out elements that go against the grain of (more dom-
inant) ideologies. 
Little brings in two further criteria on functional explanation. When explaining function-
ally, one can always ask 1) what brought the circumstances about in the first place (in the 
capitalist example, how did capitalist class in capitalist society S come about) and 2) what 
social processes on the individual level of activity reproduce this set of norms over time 
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(for example, what produces the seek for profit P on an individual level in capitalist class 
in capitalist society S). According to Little, the point of these questions is to avoid the 
postulation of any self-coherent functional explanation because not everything that can 
be functional will in fact occur. (Little 1991, 100)9. 
There is a third type of “how and why” question: what brought the ideology about in the 
first place? This question can be labelled as a question that asks for a genetic explana-
tion10. Genetic explanation does not refer to biological genes in any way but to the origin 
or genesis of ideology. To put it in technical terms, the genetic explanation shifts the 
explanans and explanandum, the thing X doing the explaining and the thing Y to be ex-
plained (see Little 1991, 3–4 on explanans and explanandum). When asking a genetic 
question about ideology, ideology is not the thing doing the explaining, explanans, but 
the explanandum, the thing to be explained. More simply put: how did ideology X come 
about? What cause(s) Y made it come about? As argued previously by Little, providing a 
genetic account offers a more full-fletched picture when analyzing functional properties 
in general. Therefore, when analyzing how ideologies function, an explanation that in-
cludes a genetic explanation is a more robust explanation than the explanations that do 
not include a genetic explanation. 
To summarize the “how and why do ideologies cause things?”, one has at least three 
relevant how and why questions:  
1. How and why do ideologies come about? (genetic explanation) 
2. How and why do ideologies cause things? (causal explanation)  
3. How and why do ideologies function? (functional explanation)  
 
2.5 What is ideology’s context? 
I will add one more question category to the framework of ideology analysis. There is a 
difference if one analyzes ideologies only as an abstract, timeless set of beliefs or if one 
analyzes ideologies in specific societies or cultures in specific times (see Freeden 2003, 
78–82). Therefore, I would add the question “what is ideology’s context?” The question 
of ideology’s context connects ideologies to different times and places. Moreover, when 
 
9 Even though Little argues for a need of micro-explanation in social sciences, he does not purport that 
everything ought to be explained solely on the level of individuals. Rather, he advocates for both, a macro 
as well as a micro analysis (Little 1991, chapter “Methodological individualism”). 
10 Geuss (1981, 19) employs similar language by defining ideology’s genetic properties as ideology’s 
origin or genesis. 
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analyzing ideologies in their context, a question that is closely related to the question of 
context is the question “does ideology change?” 
For example, one can analyze capitalism as an abstract set of beliefs (“you as a capitalist 
hold these beliefs and have these arguments for those beliefs”) or alternatively analyze 
different causal properties (causal, functional, genetic) that ideologies and ideological be-
liefs have in different cultures in different times. It is one thing to do a philosophical 
analysis on a supposedly abstract capitalist set of beliefs and another thing to conduct an 
empirical analysis on what capitalism causes in 2020 Finland, for example. If one is ana-
lyzing what ideologies really cause in the world, one ought to place ideologies in time 
and place. Therefore, the question of context is relevant. 
The answer to the question of context helps us to conceptualize the scope of ideology 
analysis regarding time and place. To provide a few preliminary distinctions, one can 
offer a micro-level analysis of ideologies. Micro-level analysis focuses on more specific 
times and more particular spatial phenomena, whereas macro-level analysis focuses on 
broader time spans and includes a broader spatial scale (Liljenström & Svedin 2005, 2–
5). In other words, macro-level analysis can for example include more broadly different 
contexts and cultures than more particularly focused micro-analysis.  
Lastly, I will add the question of change to the table of questions: do ideologies change? 
The question is important because if one considers ideologies in different contexts, the 
question is if and how ideologies themselves change as well. For example, one can ques-
tion if capitalism as an ideology in Finland in 2020 refers to the same ideology as in the 
19th century Great Britain. If it does, one can furthermore analyze similarities, differences, 
and historical changes of this ideology. Therefore, the question of change is relevant when 
analyzing if and how ideologies change over time and in different contexts. 
The last two questions of ideology analysis are thus: 
1. What is ideology’s context? 
2. Do ideologies change? 
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2.6 The table of ideology analysis 
In this section there is a summarizing framework of ideology analysis I have constructed 
so far. I will place Žižek’s analysis of ideology within this table after introducing his 
theory in the next chapter. It is worth noting that many of the boxes in the chart do not 
exclude each other out but some of them do. For example, a concept of ideology cannot 
be both broad and narrow because if the concept refers to a myriad of different things, it 
is broad, and if it does not, it is narrow. Furthermore, a concept of ideology cannot be 
thought of as descriptive (neutral), pejorative (bad or wrong), and positive (good or right) 
in the same sense at the same time. It is necessary to pick a stand: either one does not 
make a judgment, makes a negative judgment, or makes a positive one. 
The “how and why” row is an explanatory11 row. One can divide explanations to 1) ge-
netic explanations (how and why does ideology X come about), causal explanations (how 
and why does ideology X cause some Y) and functional explanations (how and what kind 
of social institutions or practices Z does ideology X support, stabilize, or legitimize). 
I argued that a robust explanation on ideology provides a genetic explanation on how 
ideology X came about, how and what it causes, and because ideologies usually have a 
disposition to persist, typically a persisting ideology is one that has some self-stabilizing 
functional properties. Therefore, when explaining what ideologies do in the world, if the 
explanation ticks all the three explanatory boxes, it is a more robust explanation than the 
one that does not. I will introduce Žižek’s theory of ideology in such a manner that it 
provides an answer to all three of these explanatory questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 See Little (1990, 3–4) for more information on what scientific explanations are. 
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The table of ideology analysis 
 
12 Karl Marx argues in Capital 3 (1999, 593) that: “In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only 
where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very na-
ture of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production.” 
13 The example is inspired by Marx. Marx in The Critique of German Ideology (2000) has an analysis of 
ideology that similarly starts from the material conditions of living men. 
14 According to Rehmann (2013, 5), this is a common interpretation of Marx. Rehmann, however, has a 
more complicated analysis of Marx’ account in his book (see Rehmann 2013, chapter 2). 
15 Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser draws attention (2012, 110–112 & 128–132) to different Ideologi-
cal State Apparatuses such as school, where the ideology of the ruling class is being taught and internal-
ized. 
What? Discursive (ideas, be-
liefs, thoughts) and/or 
non-discursive (action, 
traits, habits, rituals, etc.) 
Broad (for example, all 
culture) or narrow (for 
example, only political 
beliefs or beliefs central 
for human life) 
The content of beliefs 
(for example, capitalist 
freedom as economic 
transactions in the pri-
vate market sphere, or 
freedom as leisure time 
for Marx12) 
Good 
or bad? 
Descriptive (no judg-
ment on falseness or mo-
rality) 
Pejorative (ideology is 
morally and/or epistemi-
cally wrong) 
Positive (ideology is 
morally and/or epistemi-
cally good or right) 
Who? Individuals (what kind 
of individuals?) 
Groups (can include for-
mal institutions or non-
formal groups) 
No agents (for example, 
no emphasis on subjects: 
this position ought to 
define what holds ideol-
ogy, if anyone or any-
thing) 
How 
and 
why? 
(expla-
nation) 
Genetic explanation 
How did ideologies come 
about (a Marxist exam-
ple: bourgeoisie thought 
arises from bourgeoisie 
class interests, which are 
formed by the material 
base of society13) 
Causal explanation How 
do ideologies cause 
things? (a Marxist exam-
ple: bourgeoisie ideology 
works by masking the real 
interests and exploitation 
of the proletariat14) 
Functional explanation 
How do ideologies sup-
port, stabilize, or legiti-
mize X (usually them-
selves as well)? (For ex-
ample, the ruling class 
has power over schools, 
medias etc., where bour-
geoisie ideologies are 
internalized15) 
Con-
text? 
Context? Are ideologies 
historical, cultural, spa-
tial? Micro and/or macro-
level? 
Change? 
Are ideologies static or 
transforming? How do 
they change? 
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3. Žižek’s theory of ideology 
In this chapter, I will argue that according to Žižek, ideology means the illusion of the 
complete big Other, and this deceptive illusion takes place in subject’s unconsciously 
structured fantasies. This sounds rather obscure for a reader who is not acquainted with 
his Lacanian theory. Therefore, I will have to unpack his Lacanian theory in order to 
understand Žižek’s account. 
I will begin this unpacking from Žižek’s theory of language and connect it to his theory 
of unconscious. Secondly, I will lay out his theory of subject and map out how subject’s 
desires are unconsciously structured. His theory of subjectivity answers to the question 
“who is ideological?” in his theory of ideology. As a part of the elaboration on Žižek’s 
theory of subjectivity, I will provide a genetic explanation on how subjectivity and desire 
are born. This elaboration provides an answer to the genetic question of “how do ideolo-
gies come about?” in his theory of ideology.  
Žižek’s theory of desire is an important part of the explanation because deceiving ideo-
logical fantasies are formations of desire. Therefore, analyzing desire provides an expla-
nation on what ideological fantasies are as well. After laying down his theory of language, 
unconscious, subjectivity, desire and fantasy, I can finally properly answer the question 
“what is Žižek’s theory of ideology”. Furthermore, I will answer to the question if ideol-
ogy is good or bad in Žižek’s theory. I will argue that because there is a deception that 
takes place in ideology, Žižek’s analysis is a pejorative account of ideology; subjects who 
are under a spell of ideology are somehow deceived.  
After laying out the groundwork of Žižek’s theory and elaborating on what ideology 
means, I will answer the question “how and why do ideologies cause things” by mapping 
out effects that ideological fantasies have in Žižek’s analysis. The causal (“what does 
ideology do?”) and a functional (“what functions does ideology have?”) questions are 
answered here. This is done in order to provide a more full-fletched account of Žižek’s 
theory of ideology.  
I will furthermore argue that in Žižek’s theory, ideology has the same formal structure 
every context, that is every ideology in every context is in unconsciously structured fan-
tasies that deceives subjects. Nevertheless, the contents of beliefs and subject positions in 
different ideologies vary in different historical contexts. Moreover, I will connect Žižek’s 
analysis to place and time, answering the question “what is ideology’s context?” by 
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arguing that Žižek’s thinks that the most prevalent ideology in the contemporary West is 
neoliberalism. This claim will be elaborated on later. Lastly, I will answer the last ques-
tion “does ideology change?” and purport that according Žižek’s theory, ideological sub-
ject’s unconsciously structured ideological fantasies have a strong tendency to “stick”; 
they are difficult to change. Change is nevertheless possible by doing what Žižek calls 
traversing the fantasy.  
After this introductory work, all the questions of the framework of ideology have been 
answered. Finally, I will place Žižek’s answers within the framework of ideology intro-
duced in the first chapter and thus summarize his position. 
 
3.1 Žižek’s theory of language 
In my opinion, it is the easiest to unpack Žižek’s theory of ideology by beginning from 
his suppositions in theory of language. His linguistic analysis constitutes his theory of 
unconscious and thus functions as a background where subjectivity and desire can be 
placed on. From these elements, one can build his account of ideology. There is first, 
however, quite a lot of background theory work to be done before one can truly under-
stand his theory. This background theory work is done here in the three first sections from 
3.1 to 3.3. 
Žižek’s theory of language has a connection to structuralist ideas. Structuralists focus on 
the way that “phenomena of human life are not intelligible except through their interrela-
tions”, and these phenomena “constitute a structure” (Blackburn 2016). Little condenses 
that (1991, 102–104) according to structuralism, there are abstract underlying structures 
and many social phenomena can be explained with these underlying structures. In Žižek’s 
case, we are more interested in a branch of structuralism that purports that these abstract 
structures are linguistic, that is they “possess an abstract order akin to a syntax in lan-
guage” (see Little 1991, 107). As we shall see in the case of Žižek, language has a struc-
ture and it shapes our perception and how we conceptualize the world. Žižek argues that 
we cannot acquire knowledge of reality behind the concept of language. Rather, we are 
always confined within the structure of language. 
In Žižek’s opinion, words and concepts do not refer to things or entities in reality (Žižek 
1994, 39–45). Instead, in Žižek’s account (1994, 39–45) language is considered as a sys-
tem of differences, where if one tries to define a word, one finds other words that will fill 
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in the definition. It is as if looking up a word in a dictionary. For example, in Wikipedia 
the word “tree” is defined as “a perennial plant with an elongated stem, or trunk, support-
ing branches and leaves in most species”16. In Žižek’s terminology (compare 1992, 110), 
the characters “tree” are a signifier, which refers to the signified description “a perennial 
plant with an elongated stem […]”. 
According to Sharpe (2004, 68–69), Žižek has adopted this theory of language from psy-
choanalyst Jacques Lacan who took it up from linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Simply 
put, signifiers mean words and signified are other words that fill in the description of what 
the words mean. One can then click on the word (i.e. signifier) “perennial plant” in Wik-
ipedia, and one will find another description (signified) about perennial plants. One can 
further click the signifier “plant” and find another signified (description) about what a 
plant is, etc.  
In Žižek’s view (compare 1989, 95–96),  our way of conceptualizing the world works in 
a similar manner to browsing Wikipedia where we never actually see the trees directly 
but we always find more descriptions (signified “a perennial plant with an[…]”) that work 
as definitions of other concepts (the signifier “tree”).To stretch the example further, if one 
is browsing through Wikipedia, one will only find endless links after links that define 
concepts. One never accesses reality outside Wikipedia. Rather, we are always referring 
to another concepts within language. Language is conceived as a differential system 
where signifiers receive their meaning from referring to another signified (Žižek 1989, 
109). 
Furthermore, as is the case with Wikipedia, our language forms a structure as well. Ac-
cording to Žižek, language must form a structure because an endless chain of signifiers 
would lead to “a dispersed network of signifiers” (Žižek 2008a, 23). Žižek thinks that 
there must be something that stops the endless chain of ever-changing signifiers. Žižek 
does not in fact argue for this but one can interpret that because subjects appear to have 
quite habitual ways of conceptualizing the world and subjects appear to think that not 
everything is in a constant flow of change, there has to be something that stops this end-
less, structureless flow of signifiers (see Žižek 2008a, 23). The thing that creates the struc-
ture in the signifiers is called the master signifier17. Žižek argues that master signifier is 
 
16 See Wikipedia tree https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tree 
17 Žižek purports (2008a, 23) that ”The only possible way out of this impasse is that[--] ascribe one sig-
nifier the function[--] for all the others [--] in this way, the proper Master-Signifier is produced”. El-
sewhere, Žižek argues that Master signifier is necessary ”since it stands for the meaning as such” (Žižek 
2008a, xx). 
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the point that sutures the otherwise disconnected field of signifiers into a structured whole 
(Žižek 1989, 96 & 114–115). The master signifier is the signifier that the other signifiers 
point to for their meaning (Žižek 1989, 96–97).  
I will elaborate on Žižek’s thesis with an example. Let’s imagine a right-wing libertarian 
person called Adam. Adam opines that individual’s right to liberty and private property 
are the truest forms of freedom. He thinks that this freedom is best brought about by 
markets because they do not coerce individuals in a manner that would violate their rights, 
and they respect individual’s right to property the most (see van der Vossen 2019 on 
libertarianism). Adam is against taxation because he thinks that it is unjustified coercion 
and violates his right to his own property.  
In Adam’s case, according to Žižekian analysis, “libertarianism” is his master signifier. 
This means that other signifiers gain their meaning by referring to the master signifier 
“libertarianism”. For example, Adam might think that a truly “equal” (signifier of equal-
ity) society is a libertarian one, a truly “just” (signifier of justice) society is a libertarian 
one, and even a truly “feminist” (signifier of feminism) society is a libertarian one. All 
these signifiers, such as “freedom”, “non-coercion”, “equality”, “justice” and “femi-
nism”, etc. refer to libertarianism; they gain their meaning through libertarianism (com-
pare Žižek 1989, 96). In other words, libertarianism as a master signifier sutures these 
different signifiers together and makes Adam’s world view seem as a coherent whole18. 
If Žižek’s analysis stopped here, he would be a structuralist because Adam’s world view 
would form a coherent structure. But he is closer to a poststructuralist standpoint. Ac-
cording to sociologist Siniša Malešević (2002, 95), poststructuralist analysis emphasizes 
that there is no single theory or way of reasoning that could analyze the society objectively 
and in a totalizing manner. No theory is a closed off structure that can explain everything. 
In the spirit of post-structuralism, Žižek argues (for example 2008a, 43–46, 2008a, 171–
172 & 1992, 102–103) that the master signifier is always incomplete, even though it su-
tures the field of meaning to seem like a coherent whole. According to Žižek, the master 
signifier itself is “empty” (Žižek 1989, 172–173)19. 
This “incompleteness” and “emptiness” mean that as the referent of other signifiers, the 
master signifier does not refer to other signified for its meaning but is a referent of mean-
ing for other signifiers (Žižek 1992, 102–103 1994, 44–45). Because it does not refer to 
 
18 Another name for the master signifier is point de capiton (Žižek 1989, 95). 
19 Žižek’s theory has a more complicated relation to the so-called poststructuralists than introduced here 
(see Žižek’s characterization and critiques poststructuralism 1989, 172–174). 
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any other signified, Žižek argues (2008a, 171–172) that it can only refer to itself. To 
continue the Wikipedia example, we could imagine a master signifier Wikipedia page 
where every other Wikipedia page eventually leads. In the case of Adam, the master sig-
nifier Wikipedia page would be the page with the headline “libertarianism” and this final 
Wikipedia page of libertarianism would be an empty page that has no descriptions or 
further links but only one link: a link back to itself. Žižek purports that we discover the 
master signifier to be a tautology “A is A”, or in this case “libertarianism is libertarianism” 
(compare Žižek 2008a, 171–172). Tautology is an empty sentence because it does not tell 
what libertarianism is, just like the empty Wikipedia page on libertarianism does not tell 
us what libertarianism is. There is a tautological “empty” signifier, a gap in the middle of 
linguistic structure in the master signifier. This is ironic because the master signifier was 
supposed to suture the structure of other signifiers together into a coherent whole. It is in 
the master signifier where we find the meaningless empty sentence and discover that 
Adam’s world view is thus arbitrarily sewn together by the tautological master signifier 
“A is A”, “libertarianism is libertarianism” (compare Žižek 1994, 152–153). 
To put it more plainly with the example of Adam, master signifier “libertarianism” gives 
us no description or reason on why it connects all the other signifiers (liberty, equality, 
feminism, etc.) together.  It does not give a reason why true liberty would be the libertar-
ian form liberty or why the libertarian society would be a truly feminist society. In this 
sense, the master signifier of libertarianism is arbitrary. I take arbitrariness here to mean 
that there is no natural, universal, logical, or essential connection between all the signifi-
ers that refer to it, but the master signifier is contingent (see Žižek on contingency 1993, 
145–150 & 2008a, 129). In other words, there could be some other master signifiers with 
the same other signifiers (liberty, equality, feminism, etc.) that are built similarly; because 
of its contingency, the master signifier of libertarianism does not give us any reason why 
it would contain the truest form of all these other signifiers  
Moreover, because there is no natural, universal, essential, or logical connection between 
different signifiers, signifiers might not be wholly compatible between one another (see 
Žižek 1989, 16–18). For example, signifiers of “liberty” and “freedom from coercion” 
might in fact not be as harmonious as naming them both under the master signifier “lib-
ertarianism” might seem. There might be elements in liberty that hinder the realization 
freedom from coercion, and vice versa. To provide an example of this, we can turn to 
Žižek’s description (1989, 16–18) when he tells us that Marx already pointed out that on 
the one hand in a capitalistic society everyone has a right to own the fruits of their labor, 
23 
 
but on the other hand the worker as a worker is forced to give the a part of fruits of her 
labor to the capitalist. By defining both signifiers “liberty” and “freedom from coercion” 
under the master signifier of libertarianism makes them seem coherent, whereas in fact 
they might not be that mutually compatible at all. In this case, the worker in fact has no 
right to (all) fruits of her labor because the capitalist takes a part of the commodities 
produced in order to gain profit and run his business20. Therefore, liberty and freedom 
from coercion are (partly) incompatible in the master signifier of libertarianism. 
If there are non-compatible parts and the master signifier is arbitrary, the structure of 
language is not a fully enclosed, harmonious structure but contains inconsistencies and 
non-fitting parts, “gaps”, within it. These non-fitting gaps are what Žižek calls (1989, 
191–192) the Real. He thinks that the Real exists in these gaps and breaking points of the 
structure of language (Žižek 1989, 191–192). Despite the name, the Real has got nothing 
to do with reality because according to Žižek’s theory of language, one cannot gain ac-
quire knowledge of reality. The Real exists merely in the gaps within the structure of 
language. According to Žižek (1989, 146), Lacan argues that the Real is “impossible”. I 
take this to mean that, by definition, the Real exists only in the non-fitting parts and in-
consistencies of structure of language and is therefore not itself articulable in the structure 
of language.  
Let’s consider our example again. Naturally, Adam might have definitions on what liber-
tarianism is and when one asks him what libertarianism means, he can give a definition 
of libertarianism. Why then would Adam’s “Wikipedia page” of libertarianism be thus 
empty? If Adam can give a description (i.e. new signified) on libertarianism, why would 
his master signifier of libertarianism be truly empty? Does not Adam’s “Wikipedia page 
of libertarianism” contain some new signified if Adam has a description on libertarian-
ism? Žižek, however, adds a twist to the story. The point of the master signifier is, that it 
structures our unconscious. The master signifier structures the field of meaning uncon-
sciously, not consciously. Next, I will elaborate on Žižek’s theory of unconscious in order 
to understand his theory of ideology. 
 
 
20 Žižek here relies on Marx’s analysis of capitalism (see Žižek 1989, 16–18).  Marx argues in Capital I 
that capitalists need the value produced by the worker because capitalists extract profit from it. The value 
produced by the worker that exceeds the costs of producing of commodities is called surplus value and is 
the basis of capitalist’s profit (Marx 1996, 106–108). 
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3.2 The master signifier is unconscious 
Žižek claims that this structure of language, structured by the master signifier is in fact 
unconscious (Žižek 2008a, viii). There are a few misunderstandings regarding the concept 
of unconscious. Therefore, a clarification is in order. 
Unconscious in Žižek’s use (1989, 4–5) does not refer to any preconscious thought or 
idea that can be experienced consciously. The contents of unconscious do not “pop” into 
one’s head, as some popularized versions of Freudian psychoanalysis might suppose. In 
the popularized versions of psychoanalytic therapy that we see in the popular culture, a 
patient might, for example “recall an unconscious memory” by doing free association on 
a couch during a psychoanalytic session. The recalled memory could be that “I truly want 
to have sex with my mother” or some other prototypical Freudian theme. According to 
Žižek (1989, 4–5), these kinds of recalled memories or thoughts that “pop” into one’s 
head are in fact normal (pre)conscious thoughts. They are not unconscious in any sense, 
only ordinary (pre)conscious thoughts.  
What then is unconscious? Žižek offers an analogy of a dream. In a dream, according to 
there are three different elements (Žižek 1989, 5–6): 
1) Manifest dream-text (visuals of the dream; what you experience in a dream),  
2) Latent dream-content (the normal (pre)conscious thoughts),  
3) and thirdly, perhaps most importantly, the unconscious desire (which forms the 
dream) 
Žižek argues (1989, 6) that the dreamer encounters the world (i.e. manifest dream-text) 
in the dream as already structured. Dreamers do not pop into empty dreams. Rather, 
dreamers are placed in the middle of dreams that are filled with different visuals, sensa-
tions, encounters, etc. We do not know why or how the dreams come about; the structur-
ing of the dream is done by our unconscious desire21, in hiding from our consciousness. 
The realm of the unconscious is what constructs the dream. The dreamers can of course 
consciously wonder about “the meaning” of the dream, but Žižek purports (1989,5) that 
by reflecting on “the meaning of the dream”, one finds only normal, conscious thoughts 
(i.e. the latent dream-content), as in the popularized examples of psychoanalysis. The 
unconscious is what structures our dreams. 
Žižek draws an analogy (1993, 63) that as in a dream, the structure of language constructs 
the way we apprehend and conceptualize the world as structured. In other words, it is 
 
21 Desire will be analyzed later in this thesis. 
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because of our unconscious that the phenomenal world – the way the world appears to us 
– makes sense to us when we encounter it. We do not experience things only as a “bloom-
ing, buzzing confusion”, as William James once phrased it (James 1918, 488), but rather 
we encounter things as already intelligible, and the world usually “makes sense” to us. 
This is because our unconscious has already structured the way we perceive the world as 
is the case unconscious has already structured the way we perceive the dream22. 
The crucial point here regarding unconscious is that the master signifier does its work 
behind subject’s back, so to speak. That is, subjects do not reflectively decide on the way 
the world appears to them. Rather, the world as it appears to us is already dissected and 
conceptualized in language (Žižek 1993, 59 & 69). Thus, the master signifier structures 
our (phenomenal) world unconsciously. This is what I take Žižek to mean when he quotes 
Lacan’s famous dictum (Žižek 1989, 79) “unconscious is structured like a language”. 
Additionally, Žižek argues (1989, 104–106) that subjects whose unconscious is structured 
by the master signifier presume that the master signifier “knows”. What I take Žižek to 
mean is that the subject might not consciously know anything about the master signifier, 
but because our perception and thinking is already unconsciously structured and concep-
tualized by the master signifier, it guarantees the consistency of our beliefs about the 
world (compare Žižek 1989, 104–106)23. Žižek in fact comes across as arguing that this 
is necessarily so because otherwise the world would not make sense to us.  
To return to Adam, even though consciously he might be able to define libertarianism and 
provide coherent argumentation in favor of his views, the point is that because his uncon-
scious is structured according to the unconscious master signifier of libertarianism, it 
structures his unconscious to seem as a coherent whole for him. It is in the unconscious 
where the master signifier functions by organizing his ways of conceptualizing the world, 
not in the realm of conscious thought. In Žižek’s opinion, there must be “an empty Wik-
ipedia page” (master signifier) where the other Wikipedia pages (signifiers) link (refer) 
to because this forms for subjects a seemingly coherent, constant structure to conceptual-
ize the world unconsciously. He thinks (Žižek 1992 ,76). that without the master signifier 
 
22 I do not mean that structuring dream and structuring the world when awake are similar in every regard. 
I only suggest that according to Žižek, they are both structured by our unconscious. A dream works as an 
analogy in this thesis as an elaboration on the work of unconscious. 
23 Žižek argues (1989, 104–106) that naming creates a sense of necessity to subject that things truly are 
the way they are named, and it is master signifier that guarantees for subjects this supposed necessity that 
things are the way they appear to subjects. 
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the world would appear as a non-organized and constantly changing mess and thus would 
not make sense for subjects24. 
In the case of Adam, a Žižekian would argue that because his unconscious ways of con-
ceptualizing the (phenomenal) world are structured according to the master signifier of 
libertarianism, he is disposed to see things from the perspective of libertarianism. For 
example, if he sees taxation, he is disposed to combine another signifier “theft” to it in 
order to describe what he sees as actually happening in taxation. This conscious thought 
of theft emerges from his unconscious structures of thinking and in a sense comes “natu-
rally” to his conscious mind, without his conscious thinking. In this “naturalness” one can 
see the work of his unconscious master signifier that combined the signifiers taxation and 
theft according to the master signifier of libertarianism, spawning the conscious thought 
of theft when Adam sees taxation. 
One remark is in order. The reader might have noticed that I have not yet introduced any 
of Žižek’s arguments in favor of his account. The reason is that the arguments are not that 
explicit in his texts. Moreover, he does not really give elaborate arguments that would 
compare his stance against other theories of language or unconscious, nor does he explic-
itly argue why his accounts would be the right or the best ones. Rather, as we will see in 
the critical chapter of this thesis, Žižek’s theory usually argues within the realm of his 
own theory. I will elaborate on this claim later. 
Despite the seeming lack of explicit argumentation, there appears to be a kind of implicit 
argumentation in place. His theory of the master signifier and many other elements of his 
theory seems to rely on transcendental argumentation. According to Robert Stern, tran-
scendental arguments are structured like this: X is a necessary condition for the possibility 
of Y. Given Y, it logically must follow that X must be the case too (Stern 2019). Therefore, 
Žižekian argument for the master signifier seems to be structured like this: 
P1: Master signifier (X) is a necessary condition for the possibility of world 
making sense for subjects (Y). 
P2: The world makes sense for subjects (Y) 
Conclusion: Therefore, the master signifier (X) exists. 
 
24 In my opinion, Žižek does not take into consideration other kinds of structures besides his structure of 
the master signifier. For example, someone could advocate a kind of structuralist coherence theory and 
argue that elements in a linguage could circularly refer to another and thus form a coherent structure, 
leaving no need for an empty master signifier. 
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Why I argue that Žižek seems to rely on this kind of argumentation is that in his works I 
have read Žižek does not explicitly argue like this to prove his theories. This line of ar-
gumentation can be interpreted to be between the lines in his texts. For example, Žižek 
purports (1992, 119) that even though the master signifier is empty and contains para-
doxes, it is nevertheless “transcendental”. These kinds of notions of transcendentality 
scattered around Žižek’s works can be interpreted to point into the direction of transcen-
dental argumentation, which I outlined here. Although Žižek is not explicit, it seems that 
the existence of a master signifier is derived by using this kind of transcendental argu-
ment.  
Nevertheless, it is a matter of interpretation to construct Žižek’s argumentation in a logi-
cal and coherent manner. I will return to Žižek’s argumentation in the critical chapter of 
this thesis. In the next section, I will add Žižek’s theory of subjectivity and his theory of 
desire to the theoretical picture introduced here in order to provide an answer the ques-
tions “what is Žižek’s theory of ideology?” and” who is ideological?”  
 
3.3 Genesis of subjectivity and desire 
Thus far, I have established Žižek’s accounts on 1) how the structure of language, struc-
tured by the master signifier only refers within itself, and 2) this order of language struc-
tures our unconscious, and 3) this structure of language is incomplete; it contains gaps 
and inconsistencies (i.e. the Real).  
In this section, I will introduce Žižek’s Lacanian theory of subjectivity as well as his 
theory of desire. These two components of his theory go hand in hand with one another 
and it is difficult to imagine one without the other. I will introduce them together against 
the background of his theory of language, which was elaborated previously. 
First, I will expound upon the genesis of subjectivity because it is in my opinion the clear-
est way to understand Žižek’s account of subjectivity. This genetical account provides an 
explanation on how subjectivity and desires are born, thus answering the genetic question 
regarding Žižek’s theory of ideology. Moreover, this section provides an answer to the 
question “who is ideological?”. After elaborating on Žižek’s account of subjectivity, I can 
in the next subsection define desire and the illusion of unconscious fantasies and thus 
answer the question “What is ideology?”  
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I will begin with an example. To construct our example according to Žižek’s Lacanian 
approach, let’s imagine libertarian Adam as a toddler. Here I will lean all the way back 
to Lacan because he gives more concise theoretical background than what I have read 
from Žižek. Žižek embraces this part of Lacan’s theory as well (see Žižek 1992, 75). 
When to-be-libertarian Adam was a toddler, according to Lacan’s theory he has “motor 
incapacity” and “disjointed limbs”, which Adam does not yet manage to control (compare 
Lacan 2012, 94–96). At some point in his maturation, Adam will learn to recognize him-
self in the mirror (compare Lacan 2012, 94). This recognition in the mirror is what Lacan 
(2012) calls the mirror stage25. From a Lacanian standpoint, Adam will learn to recognize 
his body as a coherent unity in the mirror by observing himself through the image of the 
mirror (compare Lacan 2012, 94–95). 
The upshot of this mirror stage is that Adam needs another gaze, the image provided by 
the mirror, to bring an imagined structure (Gestalt) into his otherwise disjointed, non-
organized movements. Because of the unified image in the mirror, Adam learns to identify 
himself as one single thing, a coherent subject (Lacan 2012, 97).  
After this detour to Lacan, let’s return to Žižek’s texts. According to Žižek (1989, 20), 
the “mirror” does not have to be a real mirror. Therefore, the mirror in the mirror stage is 
more of a metaphor. According to this metaphor, if there was no Other gaze, no image in 
the “mirror” to bring structure, subjectivity as such would not exist (see Žižek 2008a, 
197).  
The Other’s gaze does not only mean literally the gaze in the mirror but any internalized 
concept of identity, of “who I am” that is learned through the Other (Žižek 1989, 20). The 
gaze is connected to the way one conceives oneself. According to Žižek (1994, 145), the 
subject does not discover herself ever as a pure subjectivity (“I”) but always as an object 
as well that exists under the gaze of the Other (“that is me”!)26.  
There seems to again be a transcendental argument in play here when Žižek argues that 
subjectivity is constituted by the gaze of the Other.  In other words, the Other is necessary 
for subjectivity to exist in the first place. The birth and persistence of subjectivity as such 
 
25 In the translation I used, Lacan called this stage by the name of ”mirror-phase” (Lacan 2012, 93). In 
French, the mirror stage is called stade du miroir (Buchanan 2010). Žižek calls this phase ”mirror stage” 
(see for example Žižek 1989, 20). Because this work is about Žižek, I will call this stage ”mirror stage” as 
well. 
26 There are, however, some complications. As I argue later in the thesis, the subject can never completely 
access the viewpoint of the Other (see for example Žižek 1994, 145). 
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depend on the Other. If there was no Other, there would not be subjectivity as we know 
it. 
This Other is what Žižek calls the big Other. I will clarify the concept of the big Other 
with our example of Adam. Little Adam’s caretakers might tell him that “good for poop-
ing in the toilet rather than on the carpet!”. This is how Adam’s caretakers give him iden-
tities. In more technical jargon, Žižek purports (1989, 46) that the big Other bestows sym-
bolic mandates upon subjects. These symbolic mandates give subjects names, such as 
“Good boy, Adam”. As Sharpe points out (2004, 124) the structure of the big Other bears 
norms as well. I interpret this that the big Other points out what is to be valued (pooping 
in the toilet, cleanliness of the house), what is not (pooping on the carpet, a dirty house), 
what is wanted from the subject (“poop in the toilet!”), and how subject’s identity (i.e. 
symbolic mandates) is defined in the structure of the big Other (“good boy, Adam!”)27 
The big Other is defined as the whole structure of language (Žižek 1989, 146). The big 
Other “dominates and regulates our lives” (Žižek 1992, 53). It carries normative expec-
tations, values, and subject positions. Master signifier is a part of the big Other, which 
sutures the structure of language to seem as a coherent whole for the subject (Žižek 1989, 
105). From now on, I will refer to the big Other when referring to the structure of language 
in general28. 
Žižek’s Lacanian theory of the mirror stage certainly has some intuitive plausibility. Phe-
nomenally speaking, subjects to an extent do conceive themselves as objects under the 
gazes of others. For example, in social situations people think about how they might be 
seen in the eyes of others. In social situations subjects have internalized standards on 
how to act properly and how the others might view them if they act inappropriately. These 
internalized criteria, these so-called internalized gazes of the others, structure what we 
consider as “proper behavior” and how we know how to act appropriately.  
Lacan and Žižek radicalize this idea of “internalized gaze” by purporting that in fact one 
cannot escape internalized gaze of the evaluating and norm-giving big Other, the inner 
gaze that observes us and structures the way we think about ourselves (Žižek 1989, 117–
118). What is important here is that the big Other is not a gaze of any other real person. 
 
27 There are some complex differences between the gaze in the mirror and the symbolic mandates be-
stowed upon the subject by the big Other, but these differences are not relevant for this thesis (on some of 
the differences, see Žižek 2008a, 10–13). The unified picture of the subject in the mirror is called the im-
aginary (Myers 2003, 21). 
28 Symbolic structure is another name for the big Other (Žižek 1989, 116). I will stick with the concept of 
big Other for the sake of simplicity. 
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Rather, the big Other means internalized rules, identities, and values learned and inter-
nalized from the culture.  
Žižek follows Lacan and claims that when” living body” enters the structure of language, 
the big Other twists and transforms it irrevocably (Žižek 1989, 191). Žižek argues (1989, 
138 & 2001, 55) that because of the big Other, subjects cannot return to any natural bio-
logical, instinctual state, which there might have been before. Instead, our desire and en-
joyments as subjects are transformed and mediated by the big Other. Desire is thus not 
something naturally or biologically given. Rather, it is learned by the structure of the big 
Other (Žižek 1989, 132 & Wood 2012, 80). 
Some enjoyments are shut out from the subject’s sense of self in the mirror stage (Žižek 
1989, 191). These forbidden enjoyments become thus the Real29. In the example of Adam, 
pooping on the carpet becomes forbidden and “not something Adam would do”. This 
forbidden enjoyment of Adam to poop on the carpet becomes something that should not 
exist, something unsymbolizable in the sense that the subject cannot incorporate it into 
his or her sense of self. Matthew Sharpe (2004, 7) argues that the Real usually refers to 
forbidden matters, such as violence, sex, and death. I take this to mean that because these 
matters are usually taboo in societies, they become the Real, something not accepted and 
not spoken of publicly. 
Adam sees himself only as an object in the eyes of the big Other (via internalized gaze 
and concepts of his parents in his case), but he will never be able to access the position of 
the ”gaze of the big Other”30 (compare Žižek 1989, 116–117). In other words, internally 
Adam sees himself as an object, but he does not know why these identities are bestowed 
upon him. Adam does not know why the big Other give him the identities and expectations 
that it gives him (compare Žižek 1993, 71). He will never access the viewpoint of the big 
Other that nevertheless constitutes his own subjectivity.  
As argued previously, in Žižek opinion we unconsciously believe things but do not know 
why we believe them. This is likewise with desire; we desire things, but we do not know 
why we desire them (see Žižek 1993, 31). Our way of conceptualizing and viewing the 
world is structured by the big Other, and the way we desire is unconsciously structured 
 
29 These forbidden enjoyments have a term, jouissance. Jouissance is unsymbolizable, excessive, trans-
gressive enjoyment of the subject’s body in the Real (Žižek 1989, 191 & Sharpe 2004, 64). It is transgres-
sive because it is forbidden by the symbolic (see Žižek 2001, 72–73). 
30 Žižek thinks (1989, 117–118) that because we only encounter ourselves as objects, it is important to 
analyze subjectivity by asking ”for whom is the subject enacting this [identification] role? Which gaze is 
considered when the subject identifies himself with a certain image? [his emphasis]”. 
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as well. This is precisely because of the aforementioned reasons: the big Other gives sub-
ject symbolic mandates that tell who the subject is and what to desire, but because the 
subject can never access the viewpoint of the big Other, she never exactly know why she 
desires what she desires. 
A short summary is in order. Firstly, the big Other structures the way subjects conceptu-
alize the (phenomenal) world unconsciously; the world appears to the subject as it is un-
consciously structured by the big Other, the structure of language, sewn together by the 
master signifier. There is a similar structure regarding desire as well: subjects desire as 
they are unconsciously structured by the big Other. 
For example, when Adam takes on the identity of a good libertarian boy, he learns to 
desire things that a libertarian good boy ought to desire. Such things may include, for 
example, cutting the social care of the poor because he thinks that taxation is theft. He 
supposes that there is value in desiring the things he desires. This is because he uncon-
sciously already believes in the big Other, and when the big Other gives him symbolic 
mandates (”Good libertarian boy!”), he will believe that this is who he is (”I am a good 
libertarian boy!”) and these things are valuable and worth striving for (”I should be a good 
libertarian boy!”). Of course, in real life identities are more complex than in this exam-
ple31. 
One more thing is crucial. When we think of identities given by the big Other, we are not 
always dealing with rational, organized systems of ideas as could be the case with politi-
cal ideologies. Political ideologies can try to rationalize their world views in different 
manners, for example by providing specific key objectives and giving reasons to believe 
in these key objectives (Maynard 2017, 16–17). For example, Adam as a libertarian adult 
might have rationalized his world view by trying to provide rational arguments in favor 
of his world view. 
However, for Adam’s identification as a “libertarian good boy”, the intellectual doctrines 
of libertarianism are not the most crucial aspect. More important is the imaginary realm, 
that is the realm where subject sees herself as a complete object in the internalized gaze 
of the big Other (Žižek 1994, 179 & Wood 2012, 178). The big Other does not give 
 
31 Žižek’s Lacanian analysis is not necessarily connected to childhood because the big Other and what is 
the forbidden Real might change during subject’s lifetime. As an example of this, see Žižek’s elaboration 
on Freud’s patient Wolfman (Žižek 1994, 31). 
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identities32 to subjects firstly and foremostly by offering rationalizations and argumenta-
tion but rather by imaginary Mirror stage: by offering a viewpoint from which the subject 
gazes herself as valuable and by giving normatively charged vivid images that show what 
is valuable and desirable, teaching the subject to desire.  
For example, we can imagine that Adam has learned his parents’ adoration of expensive 
clothes and luxurious goods. Unconsciously speaking, they represent (i.e. signify) the 
meaning of success to him. And if Adam in his adulthood earns some money and buys 
fancy, businessman-like expensive suits, he does not do it because of any inherent quality 
in the clothes themselves but because they are a token of success for him. Being success-
ful is a desire that he wants to fulfill, and this desire is structured by his big Other of 
libertarianism. Thus, libertarianism is not only an abstract theoretical set of intellectual 
beliefs but is structurally connected to a myriad of other meanings, for example to rever-
ence of expensive, businessman-like clothing that carry the meaning (i.e. they signify) of 
success. These meanings and desires are learned when subjects learn to desire within the 
structure of the big Other (see Žižek 1989, 106). 
I have elaborated on Žižek’s theory of language, unconscious and given a genetic expla-
nation how subjectivity and unconsciously structured desires are born. I can now answer 
the question “who is ideological?” In Žižek’s theory, the basic ideological unit is the sub-
ject who internalizes the identities, beliefs, and desires of the culture and structures her 
unconscious accordingly. This internalized, unconscious structure is called the big Other. 
However, conscious individuals with their desires and actions are more effects of the big 
Other rather than being the foremost social agents making any kind of “autonomous” 
choices. In this sense, the unconscious big Other of the individual is the thing that is 
ideological.  
 
3.4 What is ideology in Žižek’s theory?   
After doing the background work on Žižek’s theory, in this section I will elaborate on 
what ideology means in his theory. Moreover, I will answer if ideology is good or bad in 
his theory. I will argue that Žižek’s theory employs the concept of ideology pejoratively 
because subjects who are ideological are deceived. 
 
32 Žižek applies Louis Althusser’s concept of interpellation. According to Žižek (1989, 42–43), interpella-
tion is the process where the to-be-subject recognizes herself as being addressed by some symbolic man-
date (i.e. identity) and identifies herself as the carrier of this symbolic mandate. 
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What is then ideology, according to Žižek? What parts of his theory does the concept of 
ideology refer to? Žižek argues that  
“[--]in its basic dimension it [ideology] is a fantasy-construction which 
serves as a support for our ‘reality’ itself [--] The function of ideology is [-
-] to offer us the social reality as an escape from some traumatic, real ker-
nel.” (Žižek 1989, 45) 
Here Žižek is speaking of the Real in the big Other that fantasy conceals. Ideology is the 
concealment of the incompleteness of the big Other, concealment conducted by fantasy 
(see also Žižek 1992, 246). Žižek means the big Other in this quote when he speaks about 
“our ‘reality’”, and “the social reality”. As pointed out previously, there is no access to 
reality itself according to Žižek’s theory; rather, Žižek is here talking about the phenom-
enal reality constructed by the big Other. These notions of “impossibility” and “traumatic, 
real kernel” refer to the Real in the big Other. Therefore, ideology in Žižek’s theory is the 
concealment of the incompleteness of the big Other, concealment done by fantasy. I will 
next elaborate on the concept of fantasy in Žižek’s theory to clarify what this means. 
To begin, let us recall again that the master signifier is incomplete. If the big Other is 
incomplete and thus contains gaps (the Real) within it, how can it bring about a coherent 
structure to the subject? How can Adam unconsciously hold that his libertarianism is right 
even though libertarianism as a master signifier is incomplete? This is where fantasy steps 
into the forefront. Žižek argues (1989, 80) that fantasy conceals the incompleteness of 
the big Other. The main idea behind this claim is that the big Other structures the way 
Adam conceptualizes the world as well as his desires, and therefore Adam always-already 
unconsciously holds that the desires make sense. Adam does not know why the big Other 
desires these things and will not ever know because he cannot access the viewpoint of the 
big Other, but he nevertheless has grown to structure his beliefs and desires according to 
the structure of the big Other.  
Žižek argues (1992, 246) that “the big Other is in itself inconsistent” and fantasy is “an 
attempt to fill out this lack of the Other [--] (i.e. to (re)constitute the consistency of the 
big Other)”. I will provide an example to clarify this idea. Žižek (1994, 89–96) mentions 
that in courtly love, a lady is an unreachable object of knight’s desire. In other words, a 
lady is what the knight fantasizes about. I will build upon this example introduced by 
Žižek. Imagine a knight who does heroic deeds in order to be together with a lady. If the 
knight were to finally have a chance to be together with the lady, he would soon enough 
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notice that the lady is a normal, ordinary person among others, no more or no less. But 
for the desiring knight before he gets to know the lady, the lady appears as a salvation 
who could finally fulfill his desires and give him the completeness that he has always 
strived for (compare Žižek 1993, 122 & Wood 2012, 22). 
Let’s imagine ourselves asking the knight “why do you desire this lady?” The knight 
might answer by uttering vivid, poetic visual images about “the beautiful way her hair 
flowed in the wind” etc. Now, the crucial point is that these vivid, desire-inducing poetic 
qualities here are not properties of the flesh-and-blood empirical woman. Crudely put, 
not everyone can agree with the assessment “the way her hair flowed in the wind was the 
most beautifully exquisite thing I have ever seen”. Rather, the adoring poeticism springs 
from knight’s own structure of desire structured by the big Other. Unconsciously the 
knight fits the flesh-and-blood woman into his fantasy frame of the Lady (compare Žižek 
1989, 132 & 1993, 47). It is knight’s structure of desire and fantasies that Žižek points to 
when analyzing knight’s desire, not any property of the flesh-and-blood woman herself.  
In other words, the knight has been brought up believing that it is valuable and desirable 
for a knight to be together with a lady. These internalized expectations and desires are the 
big Other structuring knight’s desires. They constitute his vivid, poetic fantasy of the 
Lady33. Beyond these vivid, poetic images, the knight cannot give a proper reason why 
this thing, why this woman, and not any other thing is the one thing that would complete 
him as a knight-subject, that would make his desire finally fulfilled. Fantasy is what these 
vivid, imaginary visuals of completeness34 with the Lady are. They teach the knight how 
to desire some things as objects of desire (Žižek 1989, 132). In this case, the knight has 
been taught by the big Other to desire a Lady. This flesh-and-blood woman fits into his 
fantasy frame, into his unconscious structure of desire that lures him into thinking that 
she is the Lady of his dreams who could complete him. 
Now, the critical part of Lacan and Žižek is that there is nothing beyond these vivid, 
poetic, adoring visual images of the Lady. Beyond the fantasy images there is nothing 
that would make the knight complete. If he became acquainted with the lady, sooner or 
later he would notice that he is no more a completed person. Despite the knight pursuing 
 
33 Fantasy is always an answer to the question of ”Che vuoi?”, that is what does the big Other want from 
the subject when naming the subject as something; what is the reason why the big Other named the sub-
ject the way it did (Žižek 1989, 126–132). 
34 Žižek argues that fantasy is always a fantasy of wholeness, of there being no inconsistency (see Žižek 
1992, 104). The inconsistency refers to Žižek’s idea that the subject is always a subject of lack because it 
only exists within the inconsistent big Other and can never be completely a part of the big Other because 
the big Other itself is incomplete (see for example Žižek 1989, 73 & 1992, 58–62) 
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the completeness so eagerly, he does not know what this completeness is, and neither 
does he know what he is exactly searching for in the Lady. This is the function of the 
fantasy. The knight does not know what it is that he is looking for. He just supposes, or 
rather the big Other in him supposes that there is a secret, something to be achieved that 
makes the object worthy of his desire (compare Žižek 1989, 44). Fantasy conceals the 
fact that there is no secret; there is nothing in the woman that would make the knight 
complete. This is where ideology enters Žižek’s theory; ideological fantasy conceals the 
fact that there is nothing. As quoted above, fantasy is “an attempt to fill out this lack [i.e. 
inconsistency] of the Other” (Žižek 1992, 246). It is the vivid images that lure us into 
thinking that there is something in the object of our desire that would make us complete 
(Žižek 1993, 122), even though there is in fact nothing35. The deceiving, ideological illu-
sion here is in the lure that there is something that would complete the subject, even 
though there is nothing in the real flesh-and-blood object itself. 
The example of the knight and a Lady might appear as a sexist one, but I understand this 
example as a critical point. In my opinion, here Žižek points out that in Western cultures, 
subject positions of males and females are constructed in such a manner that woman is 
usually posited as the object of man’s desire. Žižek’s analysis of ideology focuses on the 
construction of desire. By pointing out the arbitrariness of the big Other constructing the 
fantasy and deception in fantasy, his analysis denaturalizes and critiques formations of 
desire. Žižekian analysis in this case points out that the desired, male-completing Woman, 
does not exist. There are only flesh-and-blood women, no Woman that could complete 
the male desire36. 
Is ideology then good or bad, according to Žižek? Because ideology contains a deception 
in fantasy, Žižek’s theory is a pejorative theory of ideology; someone who is ideological 
is deceived and gets something wrong. Ideological subject supposes that there is a fulfill-
ment in the fantasized object of desire, whereas in fact there is none. Therefore, Žižek’s 
theory is a pejorative theory on ideology. 
 
 
35 This is what is called objet petit a. Objet petit a is the emptiness behind the fantasy as well as the fan-
tasy that conceals this emptiness (Žižek 1994, 178). According to Sharpe, objet petit a is the supposition 
that there is “a secret”, a reason why the big Other desires what it desires (Sharpe 2004, 149). 
36 For more information on Woman as the object of desire, see Žižek’s chapter “Otto Weininger, or, 
‘Woman doesn’t exist’” (Žižek 1994, chapter 6). 
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3.5 What does ideology cause in Žižek’s theory? 
I can now answer to the question “how and why do ideologies cause things” by analyzing 
different effects and functions that Žižek’s theory of ideology includes. As argued previ-
ously, ideology, by definition, conceals the incompleteness of the big Other. This is the 
basic effect of ideology: it blinds subjects from the fact their objects of their desire cannot 
complete them. 
Žižek purports that if subjects finally noticed that fantasized objects of desire are only 
normal objects among others, it would be traumatic for the subjects (see Žižek 1989, 134 
& Wood 2012, 57). Consequently, Žižek asserts (1989, 134) that getting too close to one’s 
fantasies can be traumatic. For example, the knight in the example might have built his 
whole identity and desires around the goal of being together with a Lady. According to 
Žižekian analysis, if he finally got to be together with the lady, he would notice that the 
lady cannot complete him. This can be in fact a horrible experience for him. Knight’s 
sense of reality (i.e. the big Other) and his identity (symbolic mandates) might completely 
disintegrate; there was in fact nothing in the woman that could complete his adoring desire 
(compare Žižek 1992, 51). In Žižek’s Lacanian language, he encounters the horrid, disa-
vowed Real within the big Other (see Žižek 2008b, 6). Encountering the Real discloses 
the fact that the big Other is arbitrary, that there is no reason why the Other is structured 
the way it is structured. He will realize that this big Other and its desires are not any better 
than any other big Others and other desires. This encounter with the Real and realization 
of arbitrariness of his big Other might force him to abandon his way of viewing the world, 
his big Other, along with his old identities.  
Therefore, approaching and encountering the Real behind the deceptive veil of fantasy is 
horrible for subjects (see Žižek 2008a, xii). The subject’s world does not make sense 
anymore. Encountering the Real shatters ideological illusions and might disintegrate sub-
ject’s big Other, shattering subject’s identity within it as well. Therefore, maintaining a 
distance to fulfilling one’s fantasies is in fact necessary in order to maintain subject’s 
“sense of the world”, the subject’s big Other. 
I will employ the concept of fantasy with Adam to clarify ideological fantasy’s crucial 
functions, this time with a more political example. This helps us to map functional prop-
erties of ideology in Žižek’s theory as well as uncover some political implications of his 
theory.  
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Adam might desire to build a libertarian society and thus he becomes a politician. His 
desire revolves around building a perfect libertarian society. Let’s imagine a scenario 
where Adam becomes a famous politician in the libertarian party. He works tirelessly in 
the party in order to fulfill his fantasy of the perfect libertarian society. He ascends 
through the ranks and becomes the chairperson of the party, and eventually he even man-
ages to become the new prime minister. Now, what would be the Žižekian analysis of this 
example? 
In Žižekian analysis of ideology, Adam really does not know why he desires the libertar-
ian society. He cannot put his finger on why it just seems to make sense for him, speaking 
on the level of desire. He of course might have his own rationalizations and arguments to 
support his views, but those are not the main driving force in his life as a libertarian pol-
itician. Rather, the main driving force are unconsciously structured fantasies. He has vivid 
fantasy images of a libertarian society and he does not know where these images come 
from. The vivid images are conscious, but the structure of desire that produces them is 
unconscious. 
Let’s imagine that when Adam is a prime minister, an economic downturn occurs. Adam 
maintains that this economic downturn took place not because of libertarian political ide-
ology itself, but because of some other contingent, external conditions to his libertarian-
ism. For example, if someone argued that the economic downturn took place because 
libertarian, non-state-intervention markets leads to economic crises due to speculations 
and bubbles in the market37, Adam would contend that the downturn happened only be-
cause of something external to the libertarian ideology. For example, he might think that 
state-owned public institutions prevented the markets from functioning optimally. More-
over, Adam could for example blame the social democratic party for supporting the public 
sector excessively, which in his opinion distorted the “natural functioning of the market”, 
leading to an economic downturn.  
The upshot is that because Adam’s unconscious beliefs and desires are structured accord-
ing to libertarianism, he is disposed to find a reason about the failings of the economy in 
anything else but the libertarian big Other itself. By externalizing the blame, Adam can 
therefore hold onto the idea that if only there had been more market, not less, there would 
have been no economic downturn38. 
 
37 See for example Patomäki’s (2013) similar explanation on the 2008 financial crisis. 
38 For example, Miron (2009) argues from a libertarian perspective that government intervention to 
bailout the banks in fact worsened the 2008 financial crisis. 
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The crucial point from a Žižekian perspective is that ideologies always must externalize 
the Real, the things that do not fit within the structure of the big Other; these externaliza-
tions provide a reason why the fantasy’s fulfillment did not come about (Žižek 2008a, 
264). For example, the knight can hold onto his ideology of the perfect Lady only so long 
as there are always some contingent impediments that stop him from being together with 
the flesh-and-blood woman. There always must be some impediment to block the full 
realization of fantasy, such as evermore chivalrous duties to be completed. This is because 
if the knight approaches his fantasy too close, he will encounter the Real and notice that 
the lady is not the Woman who could complete him.  
Likewise, Adam can only maintain his fantasy of the perfect libertarian society only so 
long as he does not get too close to the fact that there is nothing behind his libertarian 
fantasy: no perfect society, no fulfillment, probably not even perfectly working markets39. 
Adam can only hold on the supposition that his ideology of libertarianism is non-arbitrary 
and coherent only so long as he does not approach his ideological fantasy too closely. The 
fantasy is Real; it is horrendous to notice that the object of fantasy does not provide the 
fulfillment desired for. 
Therefore, Adam always must come up with new excuses, seemingly contingent facts that 
bar his access to the fulfillment of his fantasy. Only then can he maintain the illusion that 
his fantasy would complete him as well as the society. To put the point in more technical, 
psychoanalytic language: symptoms, the contingent facts that stop the subject from ful-
filling her fantasy, are in fact not contingent, but functionally necessary for the subject to 
maintain her belief in the big Other (see Žižek 1989, 243 & 2008a, 89). As Žižek argues: 
”This is the paradox of the psychoanalytic concept of the symptom: symp-
tom is an element clinging on like a kind of parasite and 'spoiling the game', 
but if we annihilate it things get even worse: we lose all we had – even the 
rest which was threatened but not yet destroyed by the symptom.” (Žižek 
1989, 85) 
In the quote, Žižek is arguing that subjects always must hold onto the obstacles that stop 
them from fulfilling their desires (called “symptoms”). This is because if there were not 
these obstacles in the way of fulfilling our desires, then subjects would encounter the 
horrid fact that there is no completeness when the desires are fulfilled; the big Other had 
no reason to desire what it desires but was an arbitrary construct. Realizing this would 
 
39 Hill & Myatt (2010) comprehensively criticize the hypothesis of perfectly working markets. 
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mean facing the meaningless, anxiety-causing Real (Žižek 2008a, xii). Adam always has 
to externalize the blame on anything else but the big Other, and he might for example in 
the last instance rather blame himself of the failings of libertarian big Other (”I did not 
pursue libertarian ideology rigorously enough as a prime minister, the blame of the eco-
nomic downturn is on me!”)40 rather than disclosing that the libertarian big Other is arbi-
trary and incoherent, and in fact may have well been the real reason for economic down-
turn (compare Žižek 1991, 29–30) .  
To recap this rather complex section: by placing an emphasis on subject’s formation of 
desires in the structure of the big Other, Žižek analyzes the way subject’s desires and 
fantasies are constructed and how they in fact sustain subject’s belief in the big Other. 
The answer to the question “what is ideology?”, according to Žižek is that ideology is 
unconsciously structured fantasies that conceal the fact that the big Other is arbitrary and 
incoherent. A Žižekian theory of ideology analyzes the unconscious structures according 
to which subjects learn to desire and fantasize. Furthermore, Žižek’s analysis contends 
that subjects do not know why they fantasize of the things they fantasize about. This is 
because subject’s structure of desire is unconscious. The big Other is always incomplete 
and arbitrary, and therefore there is nothing in the object of desire that would make sub-
jects complete. If subjects fulfill their fantasies, there is no completion, but rather they 
encounter the horrendous Real of arbitrary and incoherent big Other.  
Furthermore, to answer the question of “what functional properties are there in Žižek’s 
theory of ideology?”, the main effect of the fantasy is the concealment of the fact that 
there is nothing in the object of fantasy that would complete the subject. Fantasy thus has 
the functional property of maintaining subject’s belief in the big Other. This function can 
only be upheld if subject maintains a distance to realization of her fantasy. This distancing 
is done by setting up new obstacles to the realization of fantasy.  
Functionally, there must be obstacles for subjects in the way of realizing their fantasies. 
Because the subjects believe in the completeness of the big Other, they will consider these 
obstacles as contingent, external obstacles with regards to the big Other. This is a mistake 
on subject’s part because the obstacles in Žižek’s analysis are not contingent but in fact 
functionally necessary. They are necessary because they maintain subject’s distance to 
 
40There are some complex details on how subjects can maintain a distance to realization of their fantasies. 
One of the main ways is that subjects do transgressive, forbidden things in order to keep the realization of 
big Other’s fantasies at bay (see Žižek 1992, 45 & 1994, 55 as well as Wood 2012, 30 for more infor-
mation). 
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the horrendous Real of realizing her fantasy and thus help the subject to maintain her 
“sense of reality”, her big Other. 
Therefore, the subject must maintain a distance to the big Other’s fantasies on the one 
hand, but the big Other teaches the subject how to desire and fantasize on the other. For 
example, Adam is torn between being a good libertarian on the one hand (fantasy struc-
tured by the big Other), and not getting too close to realization of the fantasy on the other. 
In this push-and-pull motion of approaching fantasies and maintaining a distance to them, 
subjects can occupy different positions and by extension different ways to structure their 
desire41. 
Is every fantasy an ideological fantasy? I have not read a passage where Žižek would 
specify between ideological and non-ideological fantasies. Therefore, I agree here with 
psychoanalytically bent political theorist Jason Glynos when he argues in his article The 
grip of ideology: A Lacanian approach to the theory of ideology (2001, 204) that Lacanian 
theory of ideology is ”a strictly formal theory of ideology”, where formality means ”the 
construction of contentless structure”, which can be utilized in different concrete analysis. 
This position in my opinion entails that the contents of ideological fantasies can be any-
thing; Žižek’s focus in analysis of ideology is in the concealment of the Real in the big 
Other that fantasies do. Every fantasy is therefore an ideological fantasy. Despite Žižek’s 
theory of ideology being formal in structure, there are some ideologies that are more 
prevalent than others in different contexts. In the next subsection, I will elaborate on 
Žižek’s account of neoliberalism, the most prevalent ideology in the contemporary West. 
 
3.6. Context of ideology: Neoliberalism 
In this section, I will place Žižek’s theory in contemporary context. I will provide a short 
summary on what Žižek considers the contemporary West’s most prevalent ideology, 
which he calls by many names42, but which can be called neoliberalism (see Sharpe & 
Boucher 2010, 179). This contextualizing provides Žižek’s analysis of contemporary cul-
ture as well as an example how Žižek’s analysis can be utilized on a societal level. I will 
rely considerably on Matthew Sharpe’s & Geoff Boucher’s book Žižek and Politics – a 
 
41 See Wood’s (2012, 132) summary on different subject positions. 
42 Sharpe & Boucher employ the names like neoliberalism, capitalism, neoliberal capitalism and liberal-
ism (see Sharpe & Boucher 2010, 73, 88 & 109). 
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Critical Introduction (2010) because it summarizes Žižek’s political thought across his 
bibliography rather well. 
What are the signifiers of neoliberalism? According to Sharpe & Boucher (2010, 179), 
the ruling ideology of contemporary society in Žižek’s opinion is neoliberalism. The mas-
ter signifier “neoliberalism” determines other signifiers accordingly. For example, “free-
dom” means “the right to invest money freely” and “equality” means the “formal equality 
of all to trade and own property, protected by the rule of law” (Sharpe & Boucher 2010, 
73).  
Sharpe & Boucher argue (2010, 89, 130 & 150) that Žižek considers contemporary sub-
jects to accept global capitalism as the only game in town; neoliberal economics delineate 
what is considered “realistic”, and any opposition to capitalism is considered a possible 
route to totalitarianism. In Sharpe & Boucher’s analysis (2010, 169), Žižek points out that 
neoliberalism conceptualizes political decisions to be made by technocratic specialists 
who supposedly rationally deliberate between different viewpoints until they reach a 
“non-ideological” consensus, where usually market logic expands evermore to each 
sphere of life. Politics is thus diminished more and more to technocratic and market-
driven thinking, which are considered as “rational” and “objective”, whereas in fact they 
are neither. According to Sharpe & Boucher (2010, 109–110 & 32–34), Žižek moreover 
criticizes the Left for accepting capitalism as the only economic system possible and fo-
cusing merely on identity politics, which tackle issues of gender, race, and sexuality but 
do not analyze capitalistic exploitation or class. 
What is the Real of neoliberal capitalism? If the signifiers mentioned above are the sig-
nifiers of neoliberal capitalism that constitute the structure of the neoliberal big Other, 
what is the Real then? In Žižek’s view (Žižek 2009, 11), capitalism is the Real itself. He 
argues (Žižek 2009, 11) that “capital determines what goes on in social reality”. Sharpe 
& Boucher interpret that this determination happens ‘behind the backs’ of agents”, and 
the “senseless and traumatic” functioning of capitalism is not experienced consciously 
(Sharpe & Boucher 2010, 133–143). 
What could this mean? I interpret Žižek that capitalism itself produces horrendous out-
comes that nevertheless are a part of normal functioning of capitalism. These horrendous 
traumatic outcomes are, as Sharpe & Boucher (2010, 178) point out, for example ecolog-
ical disaster and new Third World underclasses who bear the burdens for producing riches 
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for the wealthy West43. Žižek comments (2009, 10–13) that there is systemic violence in 
place: violence conducted by normal functioning of capitalism when the logic of capital-
ism determines daily realities of people’s lives in a coercive manner. I interpret that the 
normal functioning of capitalism creates horrible, traumatic Real that is incoherent with 
the signifiers of neoliberal capitalism. Neoliberal capitalism creates ecological disasters, 
which are incoherent with the neoliberal supposition “optimal rationalization done by the 
market”. Moreover, neoliberal capitalism creates poor, exploited underclasses, which is 
incoherent with the neoliberal supposition that everyone has “the right for one’s fruits of 
labor”. 
A more mundane everyday example of capitalism “determining our social reality” is a 
situation where a factory is moved abroad due to global competition, leaving thousands 
of workers unemployed. These workers have no say or control with regards to their live-
lihoods because the abstract logic of capitalist competition determines their lives instead 
of them44. In my interpretation, this lack of control points that in the heart of capitalism 
there is the Real of the worker. As argued previously in this thesis, the worker is at the 
same time a person who is entitled to fruits of his labor (according to capitalistic freedom) 
but is one commodity among others who produces these fruits of labor for someone else 
and has no say in the process of production (see Žižek 1989, 16–18). The laborer is the at 
the same time a person of rights on the one hand, and a commodity with no rights on the 
other. Capitalism is thus, according to Žižek’s Marxist standpoint here, incoherent (i.e. it 
contains the Real). 
What are the ideological fantasies of neoliberal capitalism? If these are some of the Real 
of capitalism, what are the ideological fantasies of neoliberal capitalism? Ideological fan-
tasies again pose these problems inherent to neoliberal capitalism’s own normal function-
ing as something external to it. For example, when there are poor and exploited under-
classes in the Third World countries and this poverty is one cause in the rise of illiberal 
religious fundamentalism, the neoliberal capitalist perspective sees religious fundamen-
talism as something that exists not because of neoliberal capitalism, but rather as some-
thing external to neoliberal capitalism (see Žižek 2009, 19–20) . Moreover, neoliberalism 
externalizes ecological disasters as something “to be dealt with”, for example by more 
“eco-friendly and pragmatic” technical innovation in the market sphere, rather than 
 
43 Quite similar remarks as Žižek made (2009, 13–15) as well. 
44Žižek points out (2009, 12) that capitalism creates “excluded and dispensable individuals from the 
homeless to the unemployed”.  
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disclosing the fact that neoliberalism’s normal functioning causes ecological disasters 
(see Žižek 2009, 16–19). The structure of ideological fantasy again externalizes the Real 
to seemingly contingent impediments that block “the true neoliberal capitalism” from 
taking place, as was the case with Adam when he blamed the social democrats for spoiling 
his perfect libertarian society. This is how neoliberal capitalists can hold onto their big 
Other. 
What is the subjectivity of neoliberalism like? Moreover, there is one more fact that Žižek 
holds crucial for contemporary ideology. It is that contemporary ideologies are no more 
conscious, but first and foremost unconscious. Žižek purports (2012, 18) that contempo-
rary “’consumerist’, post-Protestant, late-capitalist” subject is a cynical subject. Accord-
ing to Žižek (1989, 25–26), the best definition of ideology of our times is that “they [sub-
jects] know very well what they are doing, yet they nevertheless do it”. Žižek claims that 
contemporary cynical subjects are fetishists in practice, not in theory (Žižek 1989, 28). 
Furthermore, Žižek (1989, 30) purports that cynicism is a way to distance modern subject 
from her or his fantasy. There appears to be a kind of disconnect between acting and 
thinking with these so-called cynical subjects. What could this mean? 
I will analyze the structure of cynicism against the backdrop of Žižek’s theory and use 
Adam as an example for the one last time. There was a certain naivety in the example 
person Adam. The example of Adam was in a sense too simple. It seems to me that not 
many of us really build our life stories as coherently as Adam did. The example of Adam 
does not seem to be a good example on “postmodern subjectivity” that is multifold and 
changing. Žižek purports that in premodernity, the big Other was more directly assumed 
and obeyed (Žižek 2008a, 248–249 & see Sharpe 2004, 57–60), but many postmodern 
subjects do not really believe in these kinds of “grand narratives” (Žižek 2008a, 251). I 
built this kind of “grand narrative” with the example of Adam as well. Does Žižek’s the-
ory consider changing and multifold subjectivities? Is Žižek’s theory of ideology premod-
ern and thus definitely not suitable for our contemporary times? 
I would argue that Žižek’s theory includes quite a totalistic “grand narrative” because of 
the (almost) all-encompassing big Other. However, Žižek’s theory is not totalistic at the 
level conscious grand narratives45. I will elaborate on this idea. Žižek compares himself 
 
45 Sharpe & Boucher (see 2010, 229–231) criticize Žižek that the supposition of an unconscious big Other 
is too totalistic. Sharpe & Boucher furthermore point out (2010, 54–55) that Žižek has also introduced the 
idea that there could be little Others, other persons and their evaluations, in place of the big Other. This is 
however not a basic concept that Žižek commonly employs in his analysis, and therefore this idea is not 
elaborated in this thesis. 
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against what he thinks as the core of Marx’ theory of ideology. According to Žižek (1989, 
29), Marx claimed that “they do not know it, but they are doing it doing it”. Žižek argues 
that this is a lackluster analysis on how ideology functions in contemporary societies. He 
fixes the formulation (Žižek 1989, 30): “They know very well how things really are, but 
still they are doing it as if they did not know”. 
If we follow Žižek’s formulation here with the example of Adam, the postmodern cynical, 
neoliberal version of Adam “does not really believe” consciously in neoliberalism. If one 
asked from him if he was a neoliberal, Adam might even appear critical towards neolib-
eralism. Žižek would argue that in Adam’s case, Adam nevertheless unconsciously still 
believes in neoliberalism and has unconscious fantasies about a perfect neoliberal society. 
These beliefs are disavowed and repressed, they are not conscious (compare Žižek 1989, 
12). Because Adam is cynical, Adam consciously thinks and claims that he does not really 
believe in them.  
Unconsciously structured desires and fantasies cannot be accessed directly due to their 
unconscious nature. One cannot just go to Adam and ask: “please tell me, are you uncon-
sciously a neoliberal?” and get a credible answer because Adam cannot access his uncon-
scious either. Nevertheless, according to Žižek (Žižek 1989, 28 & compare Sharpe 2004, 
7), one can see the effects of subject’s disavowed fantasies in action. For example, Adam 
might always want clothes that look businessman-like, expensive and fancy. When asked 
about these clothes, he says: “These clothes don’t reflect my ideology in any way. I know 
that they look businessman-like, but I really have no ideologies regarding them, I just 
happen to like these kinds of clothes.” Žižek would argue here that Adam knows very 
well what he is doing when buying neoliberally sleek, businessman-like fancy clothes, 
but he is nevertheless doing it because he disavows his fantasies. 
This kind of behavior might point to a disavowed, unconscious fantasy of (consumerist46) 
neoliberalism. A Žižekian analysis would observe Adam’s behavior in order to deduce 
 
46 I did not cover Žižek’s analysis of consumerism due to its complexity. To condense Žižek’s position 
based on Sharpe & Boucher (2010, 139–148), I interpret Žižek’s main idea to be that contemporary ne-
oliberal subjects are consumerist as well, and this consumerism becomes a twisted duty; they not only can 
enjoy, but rather they must enjoy. To put the point differently, subjects are bombarded by consumerism, 
which is provided by neoliberalism in all spheres of life, and if there is no other framework that would 
provide other rules and norms, consumerist enjoyments turn into demands. As Sharpe & Boucher point 
out, Žižek has the conservative idea that there always must be some rules in place, provided by the master 
signifier because there must be a certain degree of social cohesion. In consumerism there are not suffi-
cient rules and norms in place, and thus the enjoyments promised by consumerism transform themselves 
into rules and demands that pressure subjects. This is the reason why in consumerism the big Other is 
even more pervasive than in pre-consumeristic societies (see Sharpe & Boucher 2010, 139–148 for more 
technical and elaborate description on the matter.) 
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what his unconscious structure of his fantasies might be. Here the concept of fundamental 
fantasy is crucial. Fundamental fantasy means that beyond the conscious, vivid fantasy 
images, there is a more crucial unconscious fundamental fantasy that spawns these images 
and teaches us to desire (Žižek 2007, 59). Fundamental fantasy is the unconscious struc-
ture behind all the more-or-less conscious fantasies. This fundamental fantasy is as well 
unconsciously structured by the big Other (Žižek 2007, 53–54). Again, this fundamental 
fantasy is disavowed because the subject cannot access the position of the big Other and 
their subjectivity as such depends on not accessing the viewpoint of the big Other; they 
can only access themselves as objects under the gaze of the big Other (compare Žižek 
2007, 53–54).  
Despite being disavowed, fundamental fantasy nevertheless guides Adam’s behavior 
(compare Žižek 1989, 80). His disavowed, fundamental fantasy causes him to act the way 
he acts because it teaches him to desire and acquire expensive clothes. Unconsciously 
structured, repressed fundamental fantasy shows in his actions rather than what Adam 
explicitly thinks and believes. In this case, a Žižekian analysis would claim that Adam’s 
big Other structures his subject position as a successful libertarian man as well as his 
desires accordingly. However, this structuring is done in a cynical fashion, where this 
fundamental fantasy is disavowed. 
How does the cynical structure of postmodern subjectivity fit into the theoretical frame-
work that I constructed in this thesis? Why should there be something as a repressed, 
unconscious fundamental fantasy? I interpret that cynical subjectivity is connected to the 
idea that the subject is in a push-and-pull motion between fulfilling fantasies and main-
taining a distance to fantasies’ fulfillment. One way to maintain this distance is to repress 
the fantasy, which renders the fantasy not conscious at all but only unconscious (see Žižek 
1989, 36). Fundamental fantasy is repressed and thus unconscious for the cynical subject. 
Cynical subject can thus maintain a distance to the big Other on the conscious level and 
avoid a conscious encounter with the Real when realizing her fantasy. 
This theory of cynical subjects has at least some intuitive plausibility. For example, many 
subjects in the more-or-less neoliberal West claim that ”I know very well that I should do 
more against the climate change” but nevertheless act as if climate crisis was “over a few 
trees, a few birds, and not literally a question of our survival”, as Žižek mockingly points 
out (Žižek 2008a, 28). Žižek would argue that regarding our contemporary subjectivity, 
our realm of desire and fantasies seem untouched by the facts of climate change. From a 
Žižekian viewpoint, our unconscious desires and fantasies are deadlocked according to 
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the big Other of neoliberal capitalism that has formed our fantasies by bombarding us 
with consumerist fantasies that teach us how to desire (Sharpe 2004, 36). Our unconscious 
structures of desire have paralyzed any alternative routes of desire and action. They ex-
plain why we cannot take things seriously some things, such as climate change, that do 
not fit into our unconsciously structured fantasies. 
Do ideologies change? After placing Žižek’s theory of ideology in contemporary context, 
there remains the question if ideologies are static or changing. Žižek’s account is rather 
static in a sense because every subject has their own way of organizing their desire in 
order to keep the big Other in place. In other words, ideologies have strong functional 
properties that stabilize and reproduce the big Other, which again reproduces ideological 
fantasies. Subjects always try to stabilize and balance their distance to their fantasies, 
which keeps the big Other in place. 
Žižek argues that it is nevertheless possible to break free from the spell of ideology. Ac-
cording to him, subjects are not forever stuck in the functional circles of their big Others. 
It is possible to break free from the vicious circle of ideology by “traversing the fantasy” 
(Žižek 1989, 141–142). Žižek explains (2008a, lxxxi) that this means “fully confronting 
the fundamental impasse of the symbolic order”. Moreover, Žižek purports (2008a, 168) 
that to traverse fantasy, subjects must disclose that subjects “never had what we [subjects] 
have lost”. What I take these remarks to mean is that in order to break free from the 
vicious circle of ideology, subject must approach her fantasy and disclose that behind the 
charming fantasy image, there is nothing that would make the subject complete. Only 
then can the subject turn “the precious gift into a gift of shit”, as Lacan famously argued 
(according to Žižek 1991, 129); turn the desired fantasy object of desire into the mean-
ingless Real, and thus break from the chains of ideology47. 
As is usual with Žižek, there is a twist here as well. If a subject manages to break free 
from the big Other, the world “does not make sense” to her. Žižek holds that the subject 
needs a new structure of language to make her phenomenal world intelligible. Therefore, 
a new big Other will take the old one’s place (see Žižek 1989, 58–59). All the changes 
are therefore from one an old big Other to a new big Other48. As argued previously in this 
 
 47There is an extra twist to this story as well. Žižek argues (1989, 80–81) that sometimes when subjects 
have traversed their fantasy, they nevertheless remain stuck in their old enjoyments, jouissance even with-
out the fantasy (see Žižek 1989, 80–81 for more information). 
48 Only a person who is psychotic does not have any big Other. According to Žižek (see 1992 ,76), a psy-
chotic means a person who does not believe in the symbolic system and thus has no consistent reality. 
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thesis, it is the human condition that there must be some big Other in order for the world 
to make sense for subjects.  
 
3.7 Žižek’s table of ideology 
After laying down the groundwork of the unconscious big Other, subjectivity, desire, fan-
tasy and his analysis of neoliberalism, it is time to summarize Žižek’s theory of ideology. 
I will summarize Žižek’s theory of ideology by providing answers to the questions in the 
table of ideology, which was introduced in the previous chapter. I will summarize what 
ideology is according to Žižek, is ideology good or bad in his opinion, who holds ideol-
ogy, why and how does ideology work, what is ideology’s context, and does ideology 
change. This sets us up for the criticism of the last chapter. 
What is ideology, according to Žižek? Ideology in Žižek’s theory is the concealment of 
the incompleteness of the big Other, conducted by unconsciously structured fantasies. In 
other words, fantasies conceal the Real, the fact that the big Other is arbitrary and inco-
herent. In Adam’s case, his libertarian fantasies conceal the incompleteness of libertari-
anism, the fact that libertarian society would not be harmonious, nor would it make him 
complete. 
Is Žižek’s theory a narrow theory of ideology if the concept of ideology refers only to 
fantasies’ concealment of the Real? On the one hand, yes, but on the other hand, no. Even 
though not everything in Žižek’s theory is ideology, Sharpe purports that Žižek’s theory 
is “grounded in a totalistic theory of signification [--] that can thus be applied to all mean-
ingfully structured human praxes, including written discourses [his emphasis]” (Sharpe 
2004, 33). I take this to mean that in order to set up Žižek’s theory of ideology as fantasies 
that conceal the Real, one has to first build his theory of the big Other, a totalistic theory 
of signification, from the ground up and place subject, desire and fantasy in it, as I out-
lined in this thesis. I agree with Sharpe in the sense that Žižek’s Lacanian theory is max-
imally broad because Žižek applies it to “all meaningfully structured human praxes”. In 
this sense, the background suppositions of his theory of ideology are broad because they 
refer to all culture in general. 
There is, however, one issue with my narrow definition of Žižek’s theory of ideology. 
The issue springs from the fact that Žižek employs the concept of ideology quite loosely 
in his works. One could argue against my interpretation that there is another meaning of 
ideology in Žižek’s works as well, which can be seen when for example Žižek calls the 
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big Other “ideological” and uses the words “ideological field” when elaborating on the 
structure of language, structured by the master signifier (Žižek 1989, 14 & 95 & 108). 
These kinds of bits and pieces in Žižek’s works seem to point out that ideology does not 
only mean the operation of concealment of the incomplete big Other, conducted by un-
consciously structured fantasies (as I argue in this thesis), but additionally means the 
structure of the big Other in general. 
Against this line of interpretation I would point out that in the aforementioned passages 
Žižek speaks about ideological big Other, not the big Other as ideology, rendering Žižek’s 
meaning ambiguous: is the big Other ideology, or is it just ideological in the sense that it 
includes ideological deceit because of the concealment of the Real? My argument against 
the first interpretation is that in order to critique something as ideology, Žižek purports 
that one must know some non-ideological truth (see Žižek 2012, 16–17). Therefore, de-
ception, getting the truth somehow wrong, is a necessary element in Žižek’s definition of 
ideology. I argued in this thesis that in Žižek’s theory this necessary deceit is in the un-
consciously structured fantasies that conceal the incompleteness of the big Other. If de-
ception is necessary for something to be labelled ideology in Žižek’s theory, I consider 
my interpretation to be more plausible because it includes deception in the definition of 
ideology, whereas defining ideology as the big Other in general loses the focus on decep-
tion. Nevertheless, Žižek is not always consistent with his use of the concept, and there-
fore broader uses of the concept of ideology can be argued for. In any case, I hold the 
deception in ideological fantasy to be the most crucial aspect, or in Žižek’s own words 
(1989, 45) “basic dimension” of ideology in his theory. 
Let’s return to the table of ideology analysis. One can ask what the content of beliefs in 
Žižek’s theory of ideology are. Because Žižek’s theory incorporates every possible hu-
man culture, the contents of beliefs can be basically anything. What is crucial for Žižek 
is that the unconscious formal structure of the incomplete big Other remains the same. 
The big Other is always incomplete and conceals the Real from the subject with illusory 
fantasies of completeness, always and everywhere.  
Is ideology good or bad in Žižek’s theory? Next, we can ask the question if ideology is 
good, bad, or neutral in Žižek’s analysis. Žižek does not only do a descriptive analysis 
but also argues that by disclosing “antagonistic” points (i.e. the Real), one is doing ideol-
ogy criticism (Žižek 1989, 110). Therefore, Žižek has a critical edge in his analysis. Be-
cause of his critical edge, I consider Žižek’s definition of ideology to be pejorative; the 
ideologies he (mainly) analyzes are considered something “bad” in the meaning that they 
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get something epistemically wrong. Subjects under the spell of the big Other are epistem-
ically wrong regarding their fantasies; they think that in the object of their desire there is 
something that would complete them, even though there is in fact nothing beyond the 
desire-inducing fantasy images. Moreover, this covers up the Real within every big Other.  
In this sense, there is an epistemological mistake, a deceit in place in every ideology. And 
a Žižekian, critical analysis gives an explanation on how this deceit has taken place, and 
why subjects keep on believing in these illusions, why the ideology “sticks”. Furthermore, 
Žižek has a theory on how to break free from the spell of ideology, which is done by 
traversing the fantasy. Moreover, he criticizes some big Others and wishes to disintegrate 
some of them, such as neoliberal capitalism (see Žižek 1993, 5 & 2009, chapter 1). I will 
critique Žižek’s pejorative theory of ideology in the critical chapter of this thesis.  
Who is ideological? Žižek has a theory of subjectivity. His basic unit of analysis seems 
to be the individual subject. There are some complications, though. As argued previously, 
Žižekian subject is not a self-sustained substance, but subject’s existence depends on the 
internalized structure of language and its internalized gaze, the big Other. In this sense, I 
argue that the basic unit of analysis is the individual subject who is shaped and affected 
by unconscious.   
Sharpe argues (2004, 51) that Žižek holds a “transcendental” theory of subjectivity where 
subjectivity is “always presupposed by and for the construction of linguistic communica-
tion” by the big Other. Transcendental here refers to Žižek’s idea that the big Other is a 
necessary condition without which subjectivity nor communication in language would 
not be possible. The transcendental line of argumentation appears to be a recurring theme 
in Žižek’s Lacanian theory. I will evaluate on Žižek’s argumentation in the next chapter. 
Even though the basic unit of his analysis is the subject and subject’s internalized big 
Other, Žižek utilizes his analysis over a range of cultural phenomena, group phenomena 
included. I interpret that he considers this as possible because in his opinion the big Other 
is always socially constituted; subjects can be born in quite similar conditions and learn 
quite similar big Others in similar cultural contexts. Thus, he seems to consider that his 
analysis of ideology is applicable to groups as well, or at least he habitually analyzes 
macro- as well as micro-level phenomena. He does not seem to think that there is a fun-
damental difference between his analysis of macro- and micro-phenomena. I interpret that 
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this is because he supposes that the order of the big Other structures every subject simi-
larly49. 
Even though his theory of subjectivity as such is ahistorical and transcendental, subject 
positions can vary in different times and places. As elaborated previously, Žižek argues 
that premodern subject might consciously believe in a monarch, or perhaps in God, and 
their beliefs and desires are more conscious in this sense, whereas contemporary subjects’ 
conscious beliefs are structured cynically in a manner that conceals the true, disavowed 
unconscious fundamental fantasy that nevertheless controls them. I interpreted that in the 
contemporary West, subjectivity is cynical in order to maintain a distance to the big Other. 
For example, on the conscious level I can be cynically critical towards neoliberalism, but 
if this does not show in my actions and I acted similarly to someone else who believes in 
neoliberal capitalism, this discordance between my beliefs and my actions can be ex-
plained by my unconscious fantasy. In this case, the unconscious fantasy is structured by 
neoliberal capitalism and it nevertheless has a grip on me and keeps me unconsciously 
attached to the structure of neoliberal big Other. 
How and why do ideologies cause things? The explanatory question “how and why do 
ideologies cause things” can be divided into three sub-categories. Firstly, one can ask a 
genetic question: how and why do ideologies come about, how are they born? Secondly, 
one can ask the general question on how and why ideologies cause things, i.e. what is it 
that they do. Thirdly, because ideologies usually have this “sticky” aspect that they tend 
to stabilize, support and/or legitimize something, usually themselves as well, the third 
question is what functional properties ideologies have, i.e. how and why do ideologies 
function. 
I will recap the genetic story in Žižek’s theory. I outlined the example of little Adam who 
learned to think of himself as a unity through the gaze of the big Other. Subjectivity is 
thus from the beginning connected to the big Other who gives little Adam symbolic man-
dates (i.e. identities) such as “Good libertarian boy!” through which Adam begins to con-
ceptualize himself as a subject. Furthermore, these symbolic mandates carry normative 
dimensions of what is considered valuable and desirable and what Adam ought to do. 
Žižek asserts that these meanings, values, and identities of the big Other are uncon-
sciously always structuring subjectivity; they make subject’s phenomenal world intelligi-
ble and transform subject’s desires according to these structures of language. The big 
 
49 The question if his macro-level analysis is overly simplistic and reductionistic is not in the scope of this 
thesis (see Sharpe & Boucher 2010, 186 for criticism on this supposition). 
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Other is always incomplete and thus broken. Fantasy is the frame that teaches subjects 
how and what to desire. That is how the concealing fantasy formation of the big Other is 
born. 
Secondly, I will summarize how ideologies cause things. The realm of ideology is uncon-
sciously structured unconsciously structured fantasies. Fantasies work by concealing the 
fact that the big Other is incomplete. This is the main effect of fantasy. 
Thirdly, concealment done by ideological fantasies has functional properties or effects. 
Precisely by concealing the brokenness of the big Other, fantasies lure the subject to be-
lieving in the coherence of the big Other and thus keep the subject “stick” to her big Other. 
Subject must maintain a distance to fulfilling fantasies because if the subject approached 
her fantasies too close, she might notice that there is nothing behind veil of fantasy and 
the big Other is incomplete. If the subject cannot approach her fantasy too closely, she 
cannot distance herself too far from it either because her desire is structured by the big 
Other. 
Subjectivity is thus in a balancing act where the subject must maintain a proper distance 
and position with regards to fulfilling her fantasies. These push-and-pull arrangements of 
approaching and maintaining a distance with regards to fantasies keep the big Other in 
place, which is the functional effect of these factors. For example, libertarian Adam can 
always postpone the realization of his fantasy about the perfect libertarian society by 
placing new obstacles in the way of fulfillment of his fantasy. Furthermore, he must ex-
ternalize the obstacles he has himself placed in order to keep believing in the libertarian 
big Other.  
For example, Adam can argue that the perfect libertarian society did not yet come about 
because the social democrats ruined the perfect functioning of the market. He would ra-
ther place the blame on everything else but the big Other of libertarianism itself in order 
to avoid fulfillment of his fantasy of the completely libertarian society. Only by setting 
evermore new obstacles to his fantasy’s fulfillment is how he can hold onto his belief that 
his big Other of libertarianism is complete. Therefore, these obstacles that appear to Adam 
as contingent (“only if there weren’t those stupid social democrats!”) are in fact function-
ally necessary to maintain a distance to the realization of his fantasy. These are the func-
tional effects that keep the subject attached to the big Other. 
What is ideology’s context? As argued previously, Žižek considers his theory to be a 
transcendental theory that applies across every culture and in every time. He thinks that 
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the formal structure of Lacanian theory is the human condition. The incomplete big Other 
is necessary, subjectivity can only exist via the mirror stage, fantasies always deceive, 
and desire is always structured by the big Other.  
Nevertheless, as argued previously, there are differences regarding different subject po-
sitions in different cultures and between individuals in different cultures. In my opinion, 
one could go so far as to claim that every individual has a particularly structured uncon-
scious regarding the contents of beliefs and desires. As argued previously, there are nev-
ertheless shared elements between larger sociocultural contexts as well. Therefore, Žižek 
considers the framework psychoanalytic theory to be applicable to individuals as well as 
macro-level phenomena, such as groups and cultures across different contexts. 
Despite Žižek’s theory of ideology being formal in structure, in his concrete analysis there 
are some ideologies that are more prevalent than others in different contexts. Neoliberal-
ism is the most prevalent ideology in the contemporary West. It includes ideological fan-
tasies that externalize the Real of neoliberalism itself. These Real of neoliberalism are for 
example ecological crisis and Third World exploited underclasses. Subjectivity of neolib-
eralism is cynically structured: there is a disconnect between conscious beliefs and disa-
vowed fundamental fantasies that nevertheless hold a grip on neoliberal subjects. 
Lastly, because there are strong functional properties and effects in Žižek’s analysis of 
ideology, disclosing and overcoming ideologies is difficult. He nevertheless argues that 
it is possible to uncover the deceiving fantasy of ideology by “traversing the fantasy”, by 
approaching the fantasy close enough so that subject uncovers that there is nothing in the 
fantasized object that would make the subject complete. Encountering this forbidden Real 
in the fantasy makes the structure of the big Other disintegrate. Žižek nevertheless argues 
that because subjectivity in the structure of the big Other is the human condition, a new 
big Other will soon enough emerge and take the old one’s place and begin structuring the 
unconscious of the subject in a new way.  
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Žižek’s table of ideology 
 
What? Discursive and/or non-discur-
sive? Ideological fantasies are 
structured unconsciously like a 
language (discursively). 
Effects of fantasies show in 
(seemingly) non-discursive 
action 
Narrow definition in the sense 
that the concept of ideology re-
fers to fantasies that conceal the 
incompleteness of the big 
Other. Broad definition in the 
sense that Žižek’s theory in-
cludes an analysis how uncon-
scious and fantasies are struc-
tured, and these structures are 
the basis of all human discourse 
and praxis 
The content of beliefs 
Žižek’s theory can include 
any contents (signifiers and 
signified). Contents are socio-
historically formed, but the 
formal structure of the big 
Other is ahistorical 
Good or 
bad? 
Bad (pejorative account) Ide-
ology conceals antagonisms in 
the big Other. Therefore, ideol-
ogy contains a delusion and is 
thus epistemologically false. 
Ideology is in this sense “bad”. 
Žižek’s analysis has a critical 
edge as well; he wishes to 
change some ideologies, such 
as capitalism 
  
Who? Individual unconscious Un-
conscious is not directly acces-
sible to subjects. Unconscious 
is socially and culturally struc-
tured. Therefore, Žižek can an-
alyze groups and cultures as 
well, but the basic unit of anal-
ysis is individual unconscious. 
The emphasis is not on con-
scious agents but on the struc-
ture of the unconscious 
  
How 
and 
why? 
(expla-
nation) 
Genetic explanation 
Subjectivity is born in the 
structure of the big Other. Sub-
jects learn to conceptualize the 
world, desire and fantasize ac-
cording to the big Other’s 
structure 
Causal explanation 
Fantasies structure what sub-
jects desire. Fantasies teach 
subjects how to desire and con-
ceals the incompleteness of the 
big Other 
Functional explanation 
By concealing the big Other’s 
incompleteness, fantasy main-
tains subjects’ belief in the 
big Other. This is possible 
only if subjects establish a 
proper distance with regards 
to fulfilling their fantasies. 
There always must be some 
externalized obstacles that 
prevent subjects from ful-
filling their fantasies 
Con-
text? 
Context?  
In every human culture and 
praxis. The formal structure is 
similar in the sense that there 
must be a big Other, which 
structures subjectivity and de-
sire. Subject positions with re-
gards to symbolic mandates 
(subject’s identities), contents 
of beliefs (signifiers and signi-
fied) and desire vary socio-cul-
turally 
Contemporary context? 
The most prevalent ideology in 
the contemporary West is ne-
oliberalism. Ideological fanta-
sies externalize the Real of ne-
oliberalism, such as ecological 
disaster and exploited under-
classes, as something contin-
gent and not an inherent part of 
neoliberalism. Subjectivity is 
structured cynically: contents of 
conscious beliefs do not dis-
close the disavowed uncon-
scious fantasies 
Change? 
Subjects are stuck between 
desiring the big Other’s fanta-
sies and maintaining a dis-
tance to their fulfilment of 
fantasy. Because of this push-
and-pull constellation, the big 
Other has a self-reproducing 
dimension. It is difficult but 
possible to break free from 
the big Other by traversing 
fantasy 
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4. Criticism 
Žižek’s theory and writings can be characterized not only as a descriptive theory of ide-
ology but also as setting up a possibility of criticism of ideology. He utilizes his theoret-
ical framework when he analyzes and criticizes prevalent contemporary ideologies, such 
as neoliberalism (see for example Žižek 2009, chapter 1). The question of ideology criti-
cism is important because when one critiques ideologies, one is not just analyzing the 
way things are, but one is pointing towards normative potentials50 and normative reasons 
one might have to build another kind of society as well as emancipatory routes to be 
released from the grips of prevailing ideologies. 
In this critical chapter, I will focus on and criticize the ideology-critical side of Žižek’s 
theory of ideology. In the first subsection of this chapter, I will argue that Žižek’s theory 
of ideology includes a structure of ideology criticism that can be called immanent critique. 
I will elaborate on the meaning and three criteria of immanent critique and argue that 
Žižek’s theory of ideology is constructed as an immanent critique. 
In the sections following the first section, I will evaluate if Žižek’s theory of ideology 
fulfills all three criteria for it to constitute a credible immanent critique. There is a sepa-
rate section in the thesis for each of the criteria. I will argue that Žižek’s theory in fact 
fails all three criteria of immanent critique because of three reasons. Firstly, his theory’s 
epistemological justifications are not robust enough. Secondly, his theory strikes as a self-
undermining theory. Thirdly, he does not provide any objective normative justification to 
evaluate different big Others. Therefore, Žižek’s theory does not constitute a credible 
critical theory of ideology and offers no credible normative potentials or emancipatory 
routes. 
There are some similar lines of criticism in the commentaries as well. My novelty is to 
pose these criticisms against Žižek’s critical side of his theory of ideology in a systematic 
fashion by introducing three criteria of immanent criticism and comparing Žižek’s theory 
of ideology to these criteria. Lastly, I will provide one possible Žižekian answer to the 
criticisms and thus point some directions for future research. 
 
 
50 ”Normative potentials” is Stahl’s formulation when he analyzes immanent critique (2013, 7). 
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4.1 Immanent critique and Žižek’s theory 
Philosopher Titus Stahl in his unpublished working paper What is Immanent Critique? 
(2013, 2) argues that immanent critique means that standards for the critique are derived 
from the object criticized and not from any independent standards outside the object of 
critique. I will expound upon this and explain the three components required for imma-
nent critique. Moreover, in this section I will argue that Žižek’s theory of ideology strives 
to set up this kind of immanent critique of ideology. 
Titus Stahl (2013, 7) argues that in order to critique to be immanent, critique must fulfill 
three criteria. 
1. Immanent critique purports that “standards or normative potentials do exist within 
social practices that are irreducible both to the actual regularities of actions within 
these practices and to the conscious self-understanding of its participants [my em-
phasis]” (Stahl 2013, 7). In my opinion, one can condense the question like this: 
what is there within social practices and why is it not clear to subjects? I will refer 
to this criterion as ontological criterion51 because it is about what there is. 
2. “[--] how a critic can find out what these standards are” (Stahl 2013, 7). In my 
opinion, the main question here is: how does the critic know what there is? I will 
therefore refer to this criterion as epistemological criterion because it deals with 
matters of knowledge. 
3. If these standards exist, why do they “constitute a reason for person engaged in a 
social practice to change their behavior” (Stahl 2013, 7). Stahl rephrases (2013, 
7) the question here: “why should anyone care?” I will therefore refer to this cri-
terion as normative criterion for action. 
The first criterion is about there being truths that are not obvious to subjects under the 
spell of ideology. These truths must “exist within social practices that are irreducible both 
to the actual regularities of actions within these practices and to the conscious self-under-
standing of its participants”. Now, the crucial word here is within social practices; they 
are within ideological subjects’ lifeworld, so to say. Despite being within their social 
practices (or lifeworld), they are not obvious to subjects because they “are irreducible” to 
both “actions within these practices” and “conscious self-understanding of its partici-
pants”. The crucial point here is that they are not clear to ideological subjects. There is in 
this sense a certain non-knowledge of these facts for ideological subjects. 
 
51 The criterion could be more precisely be called “(quasi)ontological criterion” when analyzing Žižek’s 
theory because Žižek does immanent critique within the big Other and supposes no access to ontological 
reality. I will stick with name “ontological criterion” for the sake of simplicity. 
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 The second criterion is about epistemological justification. The question here is, how 
does the ideology critic know that these non-obvious truths (of the first criterion) are true 
and some other beliefs are false. Ideology critic must provide epistemological justification 
on why her account would be the correct one and why by extension subjects under the 
spell of ideology are mistaken. 
The third criterion provides normative reasons why anyone should care; that is, if there is 
some non-obvious truth (the first criterion) that can be known (second criterion), this truth 
should constitute a normative reason for agents to act (third criterion). To rephrase the 
question of the third criterion bluntly: why should subjects not to be under the spell of 
ideology; what normative reason does the non-obvious truth give subjects to not be under 
the spell of ideology? 
Immanent critique of ideology can be considered a sub-type of pejorative account of ide-
ology. This is because the pejorative account of ideology similarly supposes that when an 
ideology critic calls someone ideological, she can do this only from a point of non-ideo-
logical, privileged place of truth (see Sharpe 2004, 26–27 & Malešević 2002, 94). In 
other words, to invoke the concept of ideology in the pejorative sense supposes that one 
knows the truth, as is the case with Stahl’s ontological and epistemological criteria as 
well, whereas someone who is ideological is considered to be mistaken. Moreover, some-
one who holds a pejorative account on ideology has normative reasons why she criticizes 
some ideology X. The question of normative justification is the case with third Stahl’s 
criterion of immanent critique as well. The difference between immanent critique and 
other kinds of pejorative critique of ideology appears to be that pejorative critique can be 
non-immanent as well; every kind of pejorative critique does not have to find standards 
or normative potentials “within social practices” as is the case with immanent critique, 
but the standards could be (for example) external as well52. 
I find the three criteria of immanent critique highly intuitive. To provide an everyday 
example of the criteria in action, let’s imagine that I believed that all dogs wanted to bite 
me. In this situation, my friend could argue that my belief was ideological53  in the 
 
52 On the different types of critiques, see internal and external critique in Stahl’s paper (2013, 6–7) and 
the following example in this thesis. 
53This example, however, depends on the definition of ideology. If the definition of ideology is narrow 
enough in scope, someone could argue that my belief about dogs wanting to hurt me does not count as an 
ideological belief. For example, Ball & Dagger (compare 2016, part 1) would argue that this belief about 
dogs does not offer an explanation of something socially important, provide criterion for making judgments, 
offer social ideals for self-identification, and provide a program of social activism. Therefore, Ball & 
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pejorative sense (i.e. this belief would get something morally and/or epistemically wrong, 
in this case epistemically wrong). She could argue that dogs are not as bad-tempered as I 
think and do not really want to bite me. This is not obvious to me because I am paralyzed 
by fear anytime I see a dog. Her critique of my belief fulfills the ontological criterion 
because she is telling here what there really exists in my lifeworld (or social practices) 
that is nevertheless not obvious to me.  
Moreover, she argues that she knows that not all dogs want to bite me because she has 
seen me with multiple friendly dogs. She points out that I would notice this fact as well 
if I was not paralyzed by fear whenever I encountered a dog. Her critique of my belief 
here provides an epistemological criterion that tells how a critic (she or even me) can 
know what there is: by being less frightened and by observing friendly dogs. 
As for the normative criterion, she argues that I should give up my belief that dogs want 
to hurt me because I actually would love to hang around with dogs if I only did not hold 
the belief that they want to hurt me. Here she fulfills the normative criterion on why I 
should care to not be ideological, why I should give up my ideological false belief about 
dogs wanting to hurt me.  
Overall, her immanent critique fulfills ontological criterion by telling me how things re-
ally are and why I do not notice it (the truth that dogs do not want to hurt me and I am too 
paralyzed by fear to notice it), epistemological criterion how she knows and how I could 
know that dogs do not wish to hurt me (she has seen it and I could see it as well if I was 
not paralyzed by fear), and a normative reason to care about this fact (I would like dogs 
and would love to hang around with dogs if I believed that they do not want to hurt me). 
Now, what makes her pejorative critique of my ideological belief immanent is that she 
does not provide me with any truths that cannot be grasped in my own lifeworld (or social 
practices).  For example, she does not argue that the dogs I encounter are in fact alien 
dogs, and I would know this if I had secret alien knowledge that she possesses, and I 
should love these alien dogs because it is the right thing to do when there are such noble 
creatures around. This would be (albeit a silly example of) an external critique where 
ontological facts are not possible to acquire inside my lifeworld but are external to it 
(compare Stahl 2013, 6).  
 
Dagger would argue that it is not an ideological belief. I will nevertheless utilize this example because it is 
easy to understand. 
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In immanent critique, the ontological fact that dogs are friendly can be discovered within 
my lifeworld. Moreover, I would surely learn to value dogs if I no longer was afraid of 
them. I would see how wonderful creatures they truly are. Therefore, the normative cri-
terion follows (in this example causally) from the ontological truth that dogs are mostly 
friendly, and I would soon enough have a reason to care about dogs if I discovered the 
ontological fact that not all dogs want to bite me. 
One clarifying remark is in order before analyzing Žižek’s theory of immanent criticism. 
Stahl distinguishes immanent critique from external critique and internal critique. Exter-
nal critique gives standards “independently of all particular social practices” (Stahl 2013, 
6). This was the case with my example of alien dogs: the truths or standards that my friend 
gave regarding alien dogs are completely outside my lifeworld (or social practices). In-
ternal critique is quite similar with immanent critique, but in internal critique the critique 
is conducted by “norms that are internal to it [social practice]” (Stahl 2013, 6). In other 
words, if in the dog example I would already love dogs rather than discover my love of 
dogs only after being non-fearfully around dogs, the normative criterion (my love for 
dogs) would already be within my belief system and thus internal to it. This is not the case 
with immanent critique where “standards go beyond both actual practice and normative 
beliefs” (Stahl 2013, 7). In immanent critique, there are some standards in social practices 
that can be found within them that can change the practices. In the example, my friend’s 
critique is immanent because she purports that if I only encountered dogs more bravely, 
I would notice that dogs are truly loveable creatures. This would change my values re-
garding dogs, rendering my friend’s critique immanent, not internal critique. 
Why is Žižek’s critique of ideology an immanent critique? To return to Žižek’s theory of 
ideology, Žižek’s theory of ideology analyses the incompleteness and gaps (i.e. the Real) 
within the symbolic structure, not outside of it. Žižek’s perspective is immanent; it is 
within the big Other that always-already structures our subjectivity and ways of concep-
tualizing the phenomenal world. According to Žižek, there is no vantage point outside the 
structure of the big Other to see “from the outside” how people are duped into believing 
ideological fantasies. Žižek’s theory does not rely on any natural, essential, or universal 
point of view outside the structure of big Other (and thus his critique is not external).  
Despite abandoning any vantage point outside the big Other, Žižek wants to save the 
possibility of ideology critique and therefore holds onto the pejorative concept of ideol-
ogy in his analysis (see Žižek 2012, 16–17). Žižek accepts the point that ideology-critique 
implies a privileged position from which one can see through the ideological 
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mystification (Žižek 2012, 16–17). Nevertheless, at the same time Žižek supposes that 
one cannot say anything about reality itself (see Žižek 2012, 16–17 & 1993, 44). If one 
cannot have knowledge about reality itself, the privileged position of truth must be dis-
covered within the big Other, rendering Žižek’s pejorative critique an immanent critique.  
Žižek does provide us with a theory of language, the big Other, subjectivity as well as 
how desire and fantasy function within it. By utilizing these theoretical pieces, he places 
the illusion immanently within the realm of fantasies structured by the big Other. Žižek 
thus offers a criticism not concerning reality itself, but rather illusions within the structure 
of the big Other.  As argued previously, he purports that behind the fantasies there is 
nothing that would make the subject complete, but subject rather finds the immanent in-
completeness of the big Other. Thus, his account of fantasy is based on a privileged point 
of truth; he thinks that if a subject were to traverse the fantasy, the subject would see 
through deceiving fantasies and disclose that the big Other itself is incomplete. This truth 
is within the structure of the big Other, and this is the reason why I consider Žižek’s 
critique of ideology to be an immanent critique of ideology. Matthew Sharpe has a similar 
assessment when he points out (2004, 6) that Žižek’s Lacanian theory offers “a new model 
of immanent political critique”. 
Žižek’s critique is not internal critique because he is aiming to transform some ideologies, 
such as neoliberalism. He is aiming to disintegrate the meanings and standards of neolib-
eral big Other in his critique and does not wish to accept them. Therefore, Žižek’s critique 
is not internal critique but rather immanent critique. Initially, his theory looks to set us up 
with the possibility of immanent critique. I will next evaluate in more detail if his theory 
fulfills Stahl’s conditions of immanent critique. 
 
4.2 Epistemological criterion 
I will evaluate in more detail if Žižek’s theory of ideology constitutes a credible immanent 
critique. I will begin with the second, epistemological criterion because I think that epis-
temological criterion precedes the ontological criterion. In other words, I contend that a 
critic of ideology must have knowledge that some X exists before she can credibly argue 
that it exists. The shorter version of the epistemological criterion is: 
2. Epistemological criterion: how does the critic know what there is?          
Or in Žižek’s theory: how can a subject know that there is some non-obvious truth in 
the structure of the big Other that is not ideological?  
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How can someone in Žižek’s theory of ideology claim to know that she is in possession 
of the truth, whereas subjects under the spell of ideology are mistaken? The most obvious 
answer to the question appears to be that if subjects traverse their fantasy, they will dis-
close the truth of the incomplete big Other. To put the same in epistemological terms: the 
incompleteness of the big Other is epistemically only accessible to subjects who traverse 
the fantasy and uncover that there is nothing in the fantasized object of desire that would 
make them complete. Those are the only subjects who know that fantasy is deceptive. 
Initially, this answer looks quite credible. Nevertheless, I will provide two criticisms 
against Žižek’s account of immanent critique. I will ask a metaquestion by turning the 
epistemological criterion back against Žižek’s own theory of ideology: 
2. How does Žižek know what there is? How can he as a critic of ideology know 
that there is something in social practices, namely his psychoanalysis, that is non-
obvious and true? 
Why would Žižek’s theory get it right rather than being a mistaken ideology itself? What 
kind of epistemological justification does Žižek have in favor of his theory? Next, I will 
evaluate and criticize Žižek’s epistemological argumentation. Firstly, I argue against 
Žižek that he does not provide a robust epistemic justification for his own theory. Sec-
ondly, I argue that Žižek’s theory of ideology is a self-refuting theory. Therefore, Žižek’s 
theory in my opinion lacks epistemological justification and leaves us with no reason to 
believe that his theory of ideology would be the correct one. 
My first criticism is that while Žižek’s theory is highly elaborate and contains different 
tools to analyze subject positions, desires and fantasies in different societies, it is unclear 
what kind of justification he provides for his theory. His books are filled with anecdotes 
as examples of his analysis, and despite their intuitive plausibility, these are hardly con-
vincing proofs that language functions the way he supposes, that subjectivity is en-
wrapped in language as he claims, that desires are structured and transformed according 
to language, and that unconscious fantasies have the functions he contends they have. 
There are fragments here and there of his argumentation54 but it would take an immense 
amount of time and work to systematize his insights into more coherent chains of argu-
ments. Because of the scattered nature of his works, some commentators claim that Žižek 
in fact has no coherent theory to rely upon but rather utilizes different concept for different 
 
54 For example, Žižek analyzes (1989, 97–105) different descriptivist and anti-descriptivist theories of 
language before introducing his theory of the big Other. 
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audiences (see for example Parker 2004, 116 & 6). I believe that there are at least bits and 
pieces of more coherent theory, which I have sketched in this thesis, but it would take 
more strict argumentative work to provide an argumentative justification for his theory. 
In my opinion, one can simply question Žižek’s theoretical suppositions. Why does lan-
guage refer only to other elements within it? Why would there be such a thing as the big 
Other? Why is desire be completely detached from biological impulses? Why does sub-
jectivity only exist under the gaze of the Other? Usually, when Žižek is dealing with these 
kinds of questions, he points out to other elements in his theory to justify his claims. For 
example, Žižek might answer that language refers only to objects within it because it 
makes the big Other seem coherent for subjects and gives subjects a sense of structured 
phenomenal reality instead of a chaotic mess. The big Other must seem coherent for sub-
jects because if this was not so, there would be no subjectivity. Subjectivity is required 
because if there was no subjectivity, there would by entailment be no big Other, which 
makes the world intelligible for subjects, etc. 
There appear to be circular elements in Žižek’s thinking; he can justify elements of his 
Lacanian framework by utilizing other elements of the very same framework as argu-
ments in favor of his theory. There is in this sense a high degree of coherence in his theory. 
I nevertheless find these kinds of arguments problematic. According to philosopher Jon-
athan Weisberg in his article about bootstrapping (2012), bootstrapping in argumentation 
means “a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source’s reliability by checking the 
source against itself”. Žižek utilizes some premises of his own theory as a proof that some 
other parts of his theory are correct, and vice versa. If there is nothing but Žižek’s La-
canian theory to verify that Žižek’s Lacanian theory is in fact are true, this indeed is “a 
suspicious form of reasoning” because if one only checks a source against itself, one does 
not know that the source, in this case Žižek’s theory, is reliable (compare Weisberg 2012). 
Therefore, some non-bootstrapping epistemological justifications are required for Žižek 
to provide justification for his theory. 
There is of course his transcendental argumentation as well. He seems to suppose that 
because things are (always-already) how they are, his transcendental theory55, which ex-
plains why things are the way they are, is correct. Are not there any alternative explana-
tions that could explain why things are the way they really are, except Žižek’s theory? 
 
55 See also Butler (2000, 12-13) who criticizes Žižek’s transcendental theory of ahistoricality and Glynos 
(2001, 16–17) who evaluates Butler’s criticism. 
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Should he not provide more argumentation on why his theory would be the right one of 
all the possible theories that explain what there is? He appears to merely suppose that his 
theory is correct because things would not be the way they are if it was not correct. To 
criticize such transcendental argumentation, I argue that these kinds of arguments beg the 
question. The transcendental argument supposes what it is supposed to proof (compare 
Stern 2012, chapter 3). It does not provide argumentation why Žižek’s theory would be 
true – it merely supposes that it is true because things would be otherwise if it was not 
true. 
Therefore, Žižek’s theory lacks robust epistemic justification. Circular bootstrapping ar-
gumentation and question-begging transcendental argumentation do not do the job. It is 
furthermore unclear what kind of justification his theory would require to be epistemically 
more credible. This methodological confusion rises from the fact that his Lacanian theory 
sits at the crossroads of philosophy, psychology, and social sciences. Žižek deploys phil-
osophical theories about the structure of language and subjectivity. In my opinion, if he 
wanted to provide a strong philosophical justification for his theory, he should provide 
more explicit argumentation in favor of his theoretical framework as well as map out 
answers to other relevant philosophical theories and their objections to his theory (com-
pare Rosenberg on philosophical discussion 1996, 54–55). Sharpe & Boucher (2010, 
223–224) have pointed out the same tendency of Žižek to avoid counterarguments against 
his theory. Žižek’s works do discuss with other philosophical theories but fail to provide 
elaborate chains of argumentation to provide strong philosophical justifications for his 
theory, nor does Žižek properly answer to criticisms against his theory. 
Furthermore, since psychoanalysis is a psychological theory in some sense as well56, the 
question remains if there should be a place for empirical justifications. Psychological the-
ories are usually tested empirically. Žižek leaves us with nothing here but the examples 
he gives of Lacanian theory in his books. They are more handpicked examples57 than 
actual empirical research conducted. If Žižek’s theory is a psychological theory, it ought 
to be tested empirically as well, for example in a Popperian manner by conducting exper-
iments that can falsify predictions drawn from the theory (see Shea n.d. & Hansson 
 
56 Žižek argues (1989, 32) that psychoanalysis is not psychology because it is not about most “intimate 
beliefs”. In the light of Žižek’s theory, I take the denial of psychology of this sentence to mean that our 
conscious beliefs can and in fact do deceive us, and therefore the point is not only to study merely con-
scious beliefs but also the way subjects’ unconsciously is structured and how it operates regarding con-
scious beliefs, for example by transferring conscious beliefs to others (i.e. the so-called Freudian transfer-
ence, see Žižek 2008a, 148 & Sharpe 2004, 49 for more information). I nevertheless contend that uncon-
scious structures of the psyche are in the scope of the field of psychology. 
57 Handpicking your evidence is listed as by Hansson (2017) as one feature of pseudoscience. 
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2017)58. Whatever the right scientific criteria and the methods to test theories are, Žižek 
does not conduct empirical psychology and thus does not provide credible empirical evi-
dence in favor of his theory59. 
A Žižekian could probably argue against this kind of empiricist criticism by purporting 
that there is no access to reality; according to Žižek’s theory of language, every field of 
science has their own big Other and different ways to structure their concepts and world 
views. By extension, because all empirical methodologies and tests are only valid in their 
own structure of the big Other, no metaepistemology or -ontology is in principle possible. 
Therefore, no empirical analysis, whether in social sciences or in psychology, will prove 
if Žižek’s theory is true or not; it is a matter of philosophical, not empirical argumentation. 
As neat as this postmodernist-echoing line of argumentation sounds, there is in my opin-
ion one weakness in it, which has been noted by the commentaries as well (see Sharpe 
2004, 217 & Boucher 2008, 11–12): if there is no access to reality itself, why should we 
believe Žižek’s metaclaims on how all language, subjectivity, and desire function? Why 
should Žižek’s theory be any more justified than any other theory? Does not Žižek fall 
into the postmodernist reductio ad absurdum: while he claims that there is no metanarra-
tive, does he not cut the ground under his own theory’s feet? 
Philosopher Roy Bhaskar in his book The Possibility of Naturalism – A Philosophical 
Critique of Contemporary Human Sciences (1979, 86–87) asserts that one criterion of a 
theory on ideology is the possibility of situating the theory within itself60. This means that 
a credible theory of ideology needs to provide an explanation on why it is “cognitively 
superior” to ideology; only from this cognitively superior point of view can something be 
viewed as ideological (Bhaskar 1979, 86–87). To put my criticism bluntly: why is Žižek’s 
own theory not one ideological big Other among other big Others? Why would it be “cog-
nitively superior” and have the knowledge on how things really are? Bhaskar’s criteria 
overlaps with Stahl’s epistemological criterion of immanent criticism: if Žižek conducts 
psychoanalytic criticism of ideology, how does he know that his own theory is non-ideo-
logical and gets it right? In my opinion, because Žižek renounces the possibility of any 
metanarrative or metatheory, he fails Bhaskar’s criterion as well as Stahl’s second 
 
58 See Shea (n.d., chapter 3) for more discussion on Popper’s criterion. 
59 Of course, one could argue that despite Žižek not providing us with sufficient empirical evidence, per-
haps some other psychoanalyst offers sufficient empirical evidence in favor of Lacanian theory in general. 
This is, however, a position to be separately argued for. 
60 See all Bhaskar’s criteria (1979, 86–88). 
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criterion. His theory becomes one big Other among other big Others and is thus a self-
refuting theory of ideology. This is my second main criticism against his theory of ideol-
ogy. 
Moreover, there is clearly a certain ambivalence in Žižek’s theory. On the one hand, Žižek 
asserts that he does not think that there is any epistemic access to reality itself, but on the 
other hand his theory relies heavily on a genetic story of a subject; a story that includes 
descriptions about the toddler before entering the realm of the symbolic. His Lacanian 
account of the mirror stage theorizes about bundles of biological enjoyments before the 
structure of language. I contend that Žižek strikes to me as breaking his own rules when 
it comes to not referring to reality as such (before or after the symbolic); his Lacanian 
theory of subjectivity refers to the pre-symbolic realm, which his theory implicitly sup-
poses as impossible to do. There is some ambivalence here with Žižek, and I will return 
to this theme when trying to provide a Žižekian defense against these criticisms. 
In this section, I contended that Žižek’s arguments lack robust epistemological justifica-
tion. Firstly, his arguments appear to be bootstrapping arguments or transcendental argu-
ments that beg the question. It is furthermore unclear what kind of justification his theory 
would require to be epistemically more credible. Secondly, I argued that by renouncing 
every metanarrative, his psychoanalytic theory does not do the epistemological justifica-
tory job because by implication his theory becomes one big Other among others. There-
fore, Žižek’s theory strikes to me as a self-refuting theory. Because of these reasons I 
contend that Žižek’s own theory of ideology fails the epistemological criterion of imma-
nent critique as well.  
One remark to mention is that I consider both criticisms here (lack of epistemic justifica-
tion and a self-refuting theory) to be valid against Žižek’s theory of ideology in general, 
not only against his immanent critique in his theory of ideology. These criticisms are not 
limited to the critical aspect of Žižek’s theory but can be extended to the whole (descrip-
tive aspects of his) theory as well. Nevertheless, because in this critical part I systematize 
and evaluate critical potential in Žižek’s theory of ideology, I introduced these criticisms 
by comparing them to Stahl’s epistemological criterion of immanent critique.  
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4.3 Ontological criterion 
If Žižek fails the epistemological criterion, what about ontological criterion, then? The 
shorter version of the ontological criterion is: 
1. Ontological criterion: what is there within social practices and why is it not 
clear to everyone?  
Or in Žižek’s theory: is there something within the structure of the big Other that 
is not ideological and why is it not obvious to subjects? 
If we follow Stahl’s ontological criterion in detail, the truth of what there is in social 
practices must be irreducible both “to the actual regularities of actions and to the con-
scious self-understanding of its participants”. In Žižek’s theory of ideology this means 
that the truth of the incomplete big Other is not obvious to participants action or to their 
self-understanding61. In Žižek’s theory, the truth of the incompleteness of the big Other 
is not consciously self-understood and is not directly visible in “the actual regularities of 
actions” because of the deceiving fantasies. Therefore, the fact that big Other contains the 
Real is not obvious to the agents under the spell of ideology. Initially, Žižek’s theory of 
ideology thus seems to fulfill the first condition that there is in fact something in the big 
Other that ideological subjects get wrong, namely the incompleteness of the big Other, 
and this deception is not obvious to subjects under the spell of ideological fantasies. 
Despite this initial plausibility, I contend that Žižek’s own theory of ideology fails the 
ontological criterion as well. I argue that epistemological criterion is required for fulfilling 
the ontological criterion. My idea here is that epistemological criterion precedes the on-
tological criterion; one must have knowledge on what there is if one is to justifiably sup-
pose that something is. Every ontological argument needs an epistemic justification. Be-
cause Žižek cannot provide a robust epistemological justification on why his theory 
would be the right theory to describe what there is, then we cannot suppose that his theory 
is right about what there is. In other words, if Žižek has no knowledge on what there is, 
he cannot credibly argue that his theory is true. Because he could not provide robust epis-
temological justification in favor of his account that there exists such a thing as big Other 
and the Real within it, he gives us no reason to suppose that such things indeed exist. 
Therefore, I maintain that he fails the ontological criterion as well. 
 
 
61 I understand Stahl’s criterion of ”social practices” in the broad sense here in a way that can include 
Žižek’s account of the big Other. 
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4.4 Normative criterion 
I argued that Žižek fails the epistemological criterion and by entailment the ontological 
criterion of immanent critique as well. Only normative criterion remains. The shorter ver-
sion of the normative criterion is: 
3. Normative criterion: why should anyone care about these existing standards 
that are not obvious to participants? What reason do these non-obvious standards 
give to care? 
Or in Žižek’s theory, what normative reason does the disclosure of the incom-
pleteness of the big Other give? Why should subjects care not to be under the spell 
of ideology? 
Rahel Jaeggi in her article Rethinking Ideology (2006, 69) argues that ideologies are not 
only an epistemic problem, but they are a normative problem as well. It is true enough 
that according to the pejorative definition of ideology, ideology gets something wrong, 
but as argued previously, the point of the pejorative concept of ideology and ideology 
criticism is not only to analyze ideologies but to transform the world as well (compare 
Jaeggi 2006, 69). This is the case with immanent pejorative critique as well. 
Commentaries have pointed out that Žižek does not, and in fact his theory cannot provide 
any criteria why, normatively speaking, anyone should care about not being under the 
spell of ideology (see Sigurdson 2016, 99–102 & Boucher 2008, 217–218). This is in my 
opinion because Žižek’s theory can only analyze normative criteria that subjects already 
hold within the structure of the big Other. His theory thus provides no justifications in 
favor of any transformative normative criterion, a criterion not already held by subjects 
in their particular big Others.  
Žižek nevertheless seems in his criticisms against capitalism to insist that traversing the 
fantasies of capitalism and disintegrating the big Other of capitalism is valuable. He has 
gone so far as to argue that even our survival as a human species depends on traversing 
the fantasy of capitalism in the face of ecological disaster (Žižek 1993, 5). Nevertheless, 
philosophically speaking, Žižek’s theory offers no external or immanent normative crite-
ria (with regards to the big Other) why any normative reasons should be more valuable 
than others and why should traversing the fantasy be more valuable than remaining 
charmed by the illusion of it. Why should, for example, subjects within the neoliberal big 
Other traverse its fantasy? Why should some big Other, for example communism, be bet-
ter than some other big Other, for example capitalism?    
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Theologian Ola Sigurdson in the article A Hermeneutic of Hope: Problematising Žižek’s 
Apocalypticism (2016, 99–102)  critiques Žižek of ”decisionism” when pointing out this 
problem with his account; if there are no normative criteria whatsoever to decide if one 
should “leap into the void” (i.e. disclose the Real) or not, normative criteria become a 
matter of arbitrary decision. Sharpe and Boucher (2010, 85) agree that Žižek denies “any 
attempt to propose a prescriptive politics [their emphasis]” and thus does not have any 
normative criteria. In my opinion, this opinion of Žižek’s is visible when Žižek contends 
that the position of ideology criticism “cannot be occupied by any positively determined 
reality – the moment we yield to this temptation, we are back in ideology [his emphasis]” 
(Žižek 2012, 17). I interpret that if there is no “positively determined reality” whatsoever, 
this means that there are no (objective) normative criteria in his theory either. 
If a subject under the big Other of capitalism traverses the fantasy of the big Other and 
her big Other of capitalism falls apart, there will nevertheless be a new ideology in place 
for the subject. This is because Žižek considers these duping ideologies of the big Other 
to be the human condition. He argues that an illusory fantasy of some kind is necessary, 
whether it be an illusion of capitalist big Other or an illusion of some other big Other. If 
this is truly so, Žižek would in my opinion have to provide normative criteria why living 
under the spell of some ideological illusions is better than living under the spell of others. 
Otherwise, his analysis of ideology remains on the level of description and does not reach 
the level of a critique if we are to follow Stahl’s normative criterion of immanent criti-
cism.  
To summarize my normative critique: Žižek’s criticism of ideology, which stresses ex-
posing the Real in every big Other, makes his account of ideology pejorative and critical 
because it offers a route to emancipation from the deceptive grip of ideology. The further 
question of course is why should subjects be released from ideology X or ideology Y, and 
which one of these is better than the others and why. Žižek’s theory leaves us with no 
normative criteria here. Geoff Boucher asserts (2008, 218) in his critical assessment that 
Žižek’s theory promotes “metaphysical radicalism of irrationality and relativism.” When 
it comes to normative criteria, I tend to agree with his assessment.  
In this critical chapter, I outlined Stahl’s three criteria of immanent criticism and argued 
that Žižek fails all these criteria. To simplify the criteria, the criteria are  
1. Ontological criterion: is there something in the structure of the big Other that is 
not ideological and why is it not obvious to everyone? 
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2. Epistemological criterion: how can one know that there is some non-obvious 
truth in the structure of big Other that is not ideological? 
3. Normative criterion: why should we care about this fact? 
I argued that Žižek’s theory does not provide robust epistemological argumentation in 
favor of his theory. Firstly, his arguments appear to be bootstrapping arguments or tran-
scendental arguments that beg the question. Secondly, I argued that by renouncing every 
metanarrative, his psychoanalytic theory does not do the epistemological justificatory job 
because by implication his theory becomes one big Other among others. Because of these 
reasons, I argued that we have no epistemic reason to agree with his (ontological) psy-
choanalytic analysis. Lastly, I argued that Žižek does not provide us any normative justi-
ficatory criteria on why exposing ideologies would be valuable and why should we value 
some big Others more highly than others. Therefore, Žižek in my opinion fails the third, 
normative criterion as well and is thus not a credible, critical theory of ideology. 
 
4.5 Žižekian answers to criticisms 
In this last section of the thesis, I will sketch a beginning of a Žižekian answer against 
some of the criticisms above. I will argue that Žižek could to take a decisive step into 
ontology if he is to provide us with a metatheory and thus perhaps evade some of the 
criticisms outlined above. 
Žižek is ambiguous when analyzing the pre-symbolic and symbolic structures (i.e. the big 
Other). He claims that “symbolic structures are always as if they always already-were” 
(see Žižek 1994, 39) on the one hand. Nevertheless, as argued previously, his theory in-
cludes pre-symbolic elements within it on the other hand. For example, he thinks that the 
birth of the big Other makes the anxiety disappear for the pre-subject (see Žižek 1993, 
92–93 & 2008a, 265–266).  
He appears to notice this ambivalence at hand as well. When theorizing about the genesis 
of structure of language, he argues that the starting point is ”[--]mythical, quasi-natural 
starting point of immediate need – the point which is always-already presupposed, never 
given, “posited,” experienced“ as such [his emphasis]” and it includes things like thirst 
and hunger. (Žižek 1993, 120). Elsewhere, Žižek purports that “this [birth of unconscious] 
absolute beginning is never made in the present: its status is that of a pure presupposition, 
of something which always-already took place” (Žižek 2001, 147). Žižek therefore ap-
pears on the one hand to notice that when he describes anything before or without the 
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structure of language, such as natural biological thirst, hunger, or the world without the 
unconscious structuring it, he does not have knowledge of what there is per se, but rather 
employs concepts such as “mythical starting point” and “pure presuppositions”, whatever 
those concepts mean. 
On the one hand, Žižek moreover argues that the Real is “the basis, the foundation of the 
process of symbolization [--] which in a sense precedes the symbolic order [i.e. the big 
Other]” and it includes “[--]the fullness of the Real of the living body” (Žižek 1989, 191). 
On the other hand, the Real is moreover “structured by it [the big Other] when it gets 
caught in its network” (Žižek 1989, 191). Žižek here points out the dual meanings of the 
Real. On the one hand, the Real is posited as the presupposition of the process of sym-
bolization and on the other as it’s leftover (see Sharpe 2004, 162).  
Something seems to be off. The Real is both “the living body” as a substance, a thing that 
exists without relying on the structure of the big Other, as well as something that is only 
generated by the gaps in the structure of the big Other. Which one is it, or is it both, as 
Žižek here supposedly suggests? And if the Real is ontological, how can Žižek again have 
knowledge concerning it because his claim “the Real exists” is made from within the 
linguistic structure of the psychoanalytic big Other? 
A postmodern solution? One could argue that this ambivalence is deliberately intended to 
be a part of Žižek’s theory. According to this interpretation, we can conceive Žižek’s 
Lacanian theory as one incomplete, incoherent big Other among other incoherent big Oth-
ers. According to Žižek (1992, 116), Jacques Lacan once denounced that “those who love 
him” should have fidelity to him. Žižek seems to suggest here that Lacan and his psycho-
analysis can be considered as one big Other. This is because this “fidelity” at work here 
is the same fidelity that is at work when subjects under ideology suppose that the big 
Other guarantees of the consistency of their beliefs62 (see Žižek 1992, 116). 
This passage can thus be interpreted that Žižek does a similar turn as Lacan did: those 
who love Žižek, make his Lacanian psychoanalytic theory their big Other and can analyze 
the world in the manner he proposes. The theory of Žižek is one big Other and is thus 
incomplete as well. From this perspective, it is only fitting that there are contradictions 
 
62 Žižek puts this point in more technical language by arguing that (1992, 116) Lacan’s theory “sustains 
itself only through the transferential relationship to its founder”. Transference means that the big Other is 
supposed to be coherent (Žižek 2008a, 148 & Sharpe 2004, 49). Therefore, there is transference with re-
gards to Lacan as well as transference with regards to the big Other. Lacan can be therefore be interpreted 
as one big Other. 
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of the Real in the middle of the big Other, in the groundwork of psychoanalytic theory 
itself because every big Other is incomplete. In this reading, this is the reason why all 
parts of the psychoanalytic theory do not fit; psychoanalytic theory is supposed at the 
same time as an ontological metatheory as well as one ideological big Other among oth-
ers. Therefore, Žižek’s Lacanian psychoanalysis is contradictory, and this reading sug-
gests that Žižek knows it as well. To support this reading, Žižek has moreover called for 
(1994, 183) psychoanalysis for constant questioning of its own position.  
This is therefore a truly postmodern solution: Žižekian psychoanalytic theory is under 
siege from itself and thus breaks itself down in the end. If there is no objective access to 
reality, Žižek’s theory that tells us that “there is no objective access to reality” is in no 
way more justified than any other theory. A postmodern solution if there was any, but 
perhaps not a satisfactory one for those who would prefer for Lacanian-Žižekian psycho-
analytic theory of ideology to provide us with objective ontological, epistemological, or 
normative criteria. 
There are nevertheless reasons to oppose this “postmodern” reading of Žižek. Žižek ex-
plicitly opposes what he calls postmodernism and post-structuralism because he purports 
that they suppose that we live in a “post-ideological” condition (Žižek 1989, xxxi). Žižek 
contends that according these so-called postmodernist and post-structuralist views, there 
are no universal truths, no objective point of reference from which something can be 
judged as false and ideological (Žižek 1989, 171–176).  Žižek contends (1989, 171–176) 
that this kind of postmodernist thinking does not take into account the Real. In other 
words, postmodernist “non-ideological” viewpoint misses the Real in every big Other, 
the Real that fantasies conceal. Žižek purports (2008a, 102) that there is an ““unhistori-
cal” traumatic kernel”, the Real that returns in every big Other. Every big Other is incom-
plete and contains the Real. The upshot is that Žižek holds that there is thus the universal, 
objective fact of the Real in every big Other that cannot be relativized. Therefore, I sug-
gest that Žižek does not take on a postmodern approach in his theory; he wants to hold on 
to the supposition that the Real is always in every big Other, and the fact of the Real is 
not a matter of perspective. 
An ontological solution? If the postmodern solution does not seem to cut it, what about 
an ontological solution then? I previously argued that the concept of the Real immanent 
to every big Other supposes a psychoanalytic metatheory. To rephrase the point, one can 
only argue that there exists such a thing as the Real from the standpoint of a Žižekian-
Lacanian psychoanalytic metatheory. Therefore, Žižek’s deadlock remains: every 
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metatheory or -narrative is incomplete and only refers to meanings within itself, but psy-
choanalysis is thought of as the metatheory to explain all other phenomena.  
I will introduce one last resolution attempt for Žižek out of his own deadlock. I will argue 
that the way out of this deadlock is to ontologize Žižek. There have been attempts to 
provide interpretations of ontologized Žižek (see Johnston 2008 and Hamza & Ruda 
2016). The language employed in these interpretations is rather complex but the main 
idea is that if the ontological reality is incomplete, that is it contains the Real, then there 
is room for autonomous action (compare Carew 2011, 5–6; Johnston 2008, 9–10 & Pluth 
2016, 107). In other words, if the reality is not causally closed (i.e. everything that hap-
pens is not caused by a necessary, physical chain of cause and effect alone), there is thus 
a possibility for non-epiphenomenal emergent ontological levels to exist, such as con-
sciousness and the structure of language that can have some kind of causal powers as well 
(compare Moore n.d., chapter 2). In other words, the main idea seems to be that if causes 
and effects in physics are incomplete (they contain the Real as well), there could be emer-
gent ontological levels, such as consciousness that can have causal powers of its own. 
According to this view, not every cause and effect happen on the level of physics. This is 
an ontologized theory of the Real because it does not only suppose that the Real is within 
the structure of the big Other but rather in the physical structure of reality itself. Moreo-
ver, this kind of ontological theory could make Žižek’s theory of language and subjectiv-
ity ontologically possible. 
In my opinion, one of the possible ways to argue for Žižek’s theory of ideology against 
the postmodernist reductio ad absurdum could be to ontologize his theory. For example, 
Adrian Johnston in his book Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of 
Subjectivity (2008) takes on the approach of ontologized Žižek and argues that Žižek’s 
transcendent theory of subjectivity is possible because of his underlying ontology that 
includes the Real (Johnston 2008, 287). Put differently, Johnston thinks that Žižek’s 
whole Lacanian theory of subjectivity is grounded in ontology.  In his view, the Real is 
not only a result of our structure of language but exists in reality as well.  By ontologizing 
his theory, Žižek could perhaps argue against the criticism of reductio ad absurdum and 
purport that his psychoanalytic theory has objective knowledge regarding reality, whereas 
subjects under the fantasy spells of big Others are ideological. Providing a fleshed out 
ontological theory looks like a step in the right direction. Naturally, Žižek would have to 
provide us with some robust epistemological justification in favor of his theory as well as 
normative criteria if he is to maintain a critical edge in his analysis. 
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This attempt of a solution, however, transforms Žižek’s critical theory of ideology from 
an immanently critical theory of ideology to some extent into an externally critical theory 
of ideology as well: the non-obvious truths would be no longer only within (immanently) 
the big Other but also (externally) in reality as well. External critique surely has its own 
problems63, but I would nevertheless suggest this route in order to provide a solid onto-
logical grounding against the criticism of self-undermining reduction ad absurdum 
mapped out in this thesis. 
In his later writings (for example Žižek 2013) Žižek has crafted his dialectical materialist 
theory, so perhaps there is an ontology in place. Nevertheless, an analysis of ontology of 
dialectical materialism is outside the scope of this thesis.  Mapping out Žižek’s dialectical 
materialism is a long and arduous task because of the sheer amount of his literary corpus 
and the fragmentary nature of his argumentation. Therefore, further research is in order if 
one is to provide a full-fletched, ontological and epistemologically justified defense of 
Žižek’s theory of ideology against the criticisms elaborated in this thesis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In the first main chapter of this thesis, I laid down a framework of ideology analysis. I 
argued that one can map theories of ideology by asking these questions:  
• What is ideology?  
• Is ideology good or bad?  
• Who is ideological?  
• How and why does ideology cause things?  
• What is ideology’s context? 
Furthermore, I provided a few preliminary distinctions on how theories of ideology can 
respond to these questions. In the second main chapter, I defined and analyzed Žižek’s 
theory by providing an answer to the questions presented above. Here is a short summary 
of Žižek’s answers. 
What is ideology? According to Žižek, ideology is the concealment of the incompleteness 
of the big Other, conducted by unconsciously structured fantasies. In other words, fanta-
sies conceal the Real, the fact that the big Other is arbitrary and incoherent. 
 
63 One of the main questions is if there is such a thing as ”the truth” to be found, and how can the ideo-
logy critic know what this truth really is (on elaboration and evaluation on these questions, see 
Malešević 2002, 92-98). 
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Is ideology good or bad? Žižek employs the concept of ideology pejoratively; he thinks 
that ideological fantasies deceive. In this sense ideology is “bad”. Žižek’s analysis has a 
pejorative, critical edge because he considers that it is valuable to disintegrate and trans-
form some ideologies, such as capitalism. 
Who is ideological? Individual subjects are ideological because of their unconsciously 
structured fantasies. The emphasis is on the level of unconscious structures that create 
ideological fantasies. 
How and why does ideology cause things? Subjectivity and unconscious are structured 
when subjects learn to conceptualize the world, their identity, and desire according to the 
structures of the big Other. Fantasy has functional effects because it conceals the big 
Other’s incompleteness, maintaining subject’s belief in the completeness of the big Other. 
Subjects cannot approach fulfilling their fantasies too close because they might disclose 
the fact that fantasies cannot complete them. By disclosing the emptiness of fantasies, the 
big Other will not appear coherent for subjects anymore and will disintegrate. Therefore, 
in order to the big Other to remain intact, there always must be seemingly contingent 
obstacles in place that prevent subjects from fulfilling their fantasies. 
What is ideology’s context? Žižek’s formal theory is applicable to every human culture 
and praxis. The formal structure is similar with regards to the big Other, structures of 
subjectivity and desire. Subject positions with regards to symbolic mandates (subject’s 
identities) and contents of beliefs (signifier and signified) as well as contents of desire 
vary socio-culturally. The most prevalent ideology in the contemporary West is neoliber-
alism. Ideological fantasies externalize the Real of neoliberalism, such as ecological dis-
aster and exploited underclasses, as something contingent and not an inherent part of ne-
oliberalism. Subjectivity is structured cynically; contents of conscious beliefs do not dis-
close the real, disavowed unconscious fantasies. 
Due to the deception that maintains subject’s belief in the big Other, change is difficult. 
Subjects are stuck between desiring the big Other’s fantasy and maintaining a distance to 
the fulfilment of fantasies. Because of this push-and-pull constellation, the big Other has 
a self-reproducing dimension. It is difficult but possible to break free from the big Other 
by traversing fantasy: by approaching the fantasies and disclosing that fantasies cannot 
complete subjects. 
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In the critical chapter of this thesis, I argued that in order to constitute a credible critical 
theory of ideology, Žižek’s theory has three criteria of immanent critique to fulfill, out-
lined by Titus Stahl. These criteria are  
1. Ontological criterion (what there is within social practices),  
2. Epistemological criterion (how does one know what there is), and  
3. Normative criterion (why should we care) 
I argued that Žižek’s theory of ideology itself fails the epistemological criterion because 
of two reasons. Firstly, Žižek’s very own theory lacks robust epistemological argumen-
tation: his arguments appear to be bootstrapping arguments or question-begging transcen-
dental arguments. Moreover, it is not certain what kind of evidence he provides in favor 
of his theory. Secondly, his theory strikes me as a self-refuting theory. This is because on 
the one hand, Žižek supposes that subjects cannot know reality, but on the other hand he 
supposes that his psychoanalytic theory describes the way things really are. 
I argued that because Žižek fails the epistemological criterion, he fails the ontological 
criterion as well. Because Žižek’s theory lacks proper epistemological argumentation, he 
cannot justifiably argue that his psychoanalytic theory knows how things really are, 
namely that the non-ideological truth of the Real exists. Lastly, I criticized that Žižek’s 
theory does not give us objective normative criterion on why we should care if one is 
under the spell of ideology and why should we value some ideologies more highly than 
others. 
In my opinion, to avoid the criticism of his theory being self-undermining, Žižek’s theory 
could be ontologized. If he purported that the Real does not only exist within the structure 
of the big Other and its gaps but also in reality as well, he might be able to provide us 
with an objective ontological foundation for building his critical theory of ideology. I 
concluded that by ontologizing his theory, Žižek could perhaps argue against the criti-
cisms by purporting that his psychoanalytic theory has objective knowledge regarding 
reality and other subjects under the fantasy spells of big Others nevertheless remain ide-
ological. This is, however, a question for further research. 
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